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ABSTRACT

This Article establishes the subject of federal administrative investigations as a new area
of study in administrative law. While the literature has addressed investigations by specific
agencies and congressional investigations, there is no general account for the trans-substantive
constitutional value of administrative investigations. This Article provides such an account by
exploring the positive law, agency behaviors, and constraints pertaining to this unresearched
field. It concludes with some urgency that the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946—the
statute that stands as a bill of rights for the Administrative State—does not serve to regulate
administrative investigations and that the Article III courts have held that such agency behavior
is essentially unreviewable since the mid-twentieth century. It identifies the historical guideposts
of administrative investigations and analyzes the substantial power agencies wield when they
investigate. It surveys and analyzes the limiting principles in law that operate as nominal
constraints to unlawful administrative investigative behavior. This Article concludes by
considering procedural and substantive constraints that could be implemented to align agency
investigations with constitutional and statutory norms without sacrificing their ability to fulfill
their critical missions for the American public.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Almost uniformly, federal agencies investigate. Armed with broad or vague mandates,
agencies investigate matters within their purview that they might be able to enforce or regulate.
This domain is shrouded in considerable mystery. The final agency action following an
investigation does not always disclose the full extent of the agency’s inquiry. If agencies decline
to act on the results of an investigation, the public will likely never know that it took place, aside
from the targets of the investigation or third parties who receive agency requests for information
under the threat of compulsion, such as subpoenas or warrants.
The full extent of an agency investigation can be fearsome. The Federal Trade
Commission (“FTC”) doggedly investigated a company called LabMD, which cost the business
millions to defend and ultimately caused its shuttering. 1 Under the strain of a multiyear FTC
investigation, LabMD saw its revenue halved over the course of a year and its insurers refuse to
renew the company’s policies.2 In January 2014, the CEO shut down the company due to the
“psychological warfare the FTC did on the company,” which included hammering LabMD with
continual demands which relented only upon settlement. 3 Part of the cost to LabMD came from
protracted litigation spurred by allegedly falsified information that a cyber-security firm gave the
government,4 and allegations that a Big Law firm covered up for that firm. 5 A House Oversight
Committee report later concluded that the FTC had sacrificed “good government” in using a
conflicted third party’s leads to “obtain information validating its regulatory authority” and
providing the third party with “actionable information that it exploited for monetary gain.” 6
Whether deployed nobly or not, agency investigative tools are powerful and merit
examination. This Article reveals and probes federal agency investigations, their legal
foundation and constraints, and how the People can act to improve agency behavior. Our
nuanced inquiry into administrative investigations is the first of its kind. 7 Despite the richness,
1

Dune Lawrence, A Leak Wounded This Company. Fighting the Feds Finished It Off,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 25, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2016-labmdftc-tiversa/.
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Joel Schectman, Exclusive: DOJ Probes Allegations that Tiversa Lied to FTC about Data
Breaches, REUTERS (Mar. 17, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tiversa-doj-probeexclusive-idUSKCN0WK027.
5
Kathryn Rubino, Biglaw Firm Accused of Covering Up for Hacker, ABOVE THE LAW (May 8,
2018), https://abovethelaw.com/2018/05/biglaw-firm-accused-of-covering-up-for-hacker/.
6
Lawrence, supra note 1; see also Alison Frankel, There’s a Big Problem for the FTC Lurking
in 11th Circuit’s LabMD Data-Security Ruling, REUTERS (June 7, 2018),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-otc-labmd/theres-a-big-problem-for-the-ftc-lurking-in-11thcircuits-labmd-data-security-ruling-idUSKCN1J32S2.
7
The last article that appears to have addressed the general topic of agency investigations was
written in 1985. John W. Bagby, Administrative Investigations: Preserving a Reasonable
Balance Between Agency Powers and Target Rights, 23 AM. BUS. L.J. 319 (1985). Professor
1
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ubiquity, and importance of administrative investigations, it has never been studied in depth.
Others have obliquely touched on the some of the topics that this Article squarely addresses. 8
The Supreme Court has recently addressed the scope of administrative warrants and subpoenas, 9
but it has not examined the foundation of its modern jurisprudence for evaluating the lawfulness
of agency investigations or to develop a touchstone for agencies and the public. Instead, the
Court catalyzed the flourishment of a highly deferential standard that rarely results in the
quashing of agency investigative action or the exercise of agency self-restraint. The Court has
also refrained from acknowledging that the foundations of its earlier cases have been eroded by
more recent developments in both constitutional law and administrative law.
Our research has led us to conclude that courts are not using the Fourth Amendment to
meaningfully rein in agency investigative excesses, and that courts are not using the
Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (“APA”) at all to regulate agency investigative behavior.
Courts have consistently held that investigative behavior is unreviewable for lack of finality.
The following chart displays how administrative investigations are not constrained by positive
procedures or judicial review under the APA.

Judicially Recognized Positive APA Procedures and Article III Review of Administrative Behaviors
(all citations to title 5 U.S. Code)
Investigative
Behavior/Action
Positive
procedures?

No10

Reviewable
under § 704?

Rarely

Informal
Adjudication
& Licensure
No, save for
§ 555(e)11

Formal
Adjudication
& Licensure
§§ 554, 556,
557

Subregulatory
Rulemaking
§ 553

Informal
Legislative
Rulemaking
§ 553

Formal
Legislative
Rulemaking
§§ 553, 556,
557

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Philip Hamburger has discussed “Inquisitorial Process” and “Prerogative Orders and Warrants”
in a historical lens, but has not engaged on this general topic. Philip Hamburger, I S
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 157–90 (2014). See also, Mila Sohoni, Crackdowns, 31 VA.
L. REV. 31 (2017) (on enforcement discretion); Zachary Price, Enforcement Discretion and
Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 671 (2014) (same).
8
See, e.g., MICHAEL ASIMOW, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION
OUTSIDE THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT (2019),
https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Federal%20Administrative%20Adj%20Outsi
de%20the%20APA%20-%20Final.pdf.
9
See, e.g., McLane Co. v. EEOC, 137 S. Ct. 1159, 1166-70 (2017) (holding that a district court’s
decision to enforce or quash an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission administrative
subpoena is reviewed for abuse of discretion, not de novo, with reference to “longstanding
practice of the courts of appeals in reviewing a district court’s decision to enforce or quash an
administrative subpoena”).
10
No federal court has held that administrative investigative behavior is reviewable on its face.
11
Butte Cty. v. Hogen, 613 F.3d 190, 194 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (concluding that under 5 U.S.C.
§ 555(e), “the agency must provide an interested party . . . with a brief statement of the grounds
for denial” in an informal adjudication).
2
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This Article first analyzes the evolution of the Supreme Court’s treatment of investigative
actions and concludes that the U.S. Constitution provides no meaningful barrier to such exercises
of investigative power. It identifies and analyzes how the APA never regulated the civil
investigative conduct of agencies. To aid this Article’s navigation into these uncharted waters,
Part II looks into the history of agency investigations to see whether and how they have been
constrained. Here we fashion a working definition to use as a foundation for our examination.
Part III surveys the range of agency investigative techniques and showcases the degree of power
agencies wield when they investigate.
Part IV analyzes the efficacy of checks on agency investigatory abuses. These checks
manifest in hard and soft forms. Hard constraints, like the APA and the Bill of Rights, provide
direct avenues for inappropriately-investigated individuals to seek judicial redress. Soft
constraints, like the separation of powers principle of the Constitution and Congress’s powers of
oversight and the purse, merit discussion but are less directly able to contain abusive
investigations. Likewise, the exercise of executive branch self-restraint is a suboptimal solution
due to a durability deficit. Our research leads us to conclude that there are minimal barriers
applied throughout the federal government under the innumerable administrative statutory
schemes that facilitate investigations and that any enlargement of prosecutorial behavior in light
of new technologies could evolve to an unanticipated and unprecedented total enforcement
environment in portions of administrative law.
To assess the desirability of heightened barriers, Part V examines how administrative
investigations further the purpose of agencies in the constitutional order. Proceeding from the
conclusion that adequate restraints are lacking, this Part establishes why checks are needed on
investigative actions by chronicling abuses and inefficiencies in agency investigations.
Part VI identifies and analyzes potential solutions to unlawful investigative acts that
could be utilized to calibrate agency investigations into constitutional and statutory norms
without foreclosing agencies’ ability to lawfully execute their respective missions.
II. TRACING ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATIONS
A. Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Investigations
As long as there has been civilized government, there has been executive investigation. 12
The concept of administrative investigations draws from this legacy. 13 In medieval England, the
12

1 Samuel 14:38 (“Saul said, ‘Draw near here, all you chiefs of the people, and investigate and
see how this sin has happened today.’”).
13
Kenneth Culp Davis, The Administrative Power of Investigation, 56 YALE L.J. 1111, 1111–14
(1947) (beginning in biblical times and continuing through World War II and noting, “The story
of the development of the administrative power of investigation is rather dramatic.”).
3
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King’s chancellor, an administrative official, commonly issued writs as royal commands. 14
During the seventeenth century, the powerful Star Chamber issued broad warrants permitting
searches of the papers of political suspects.15 Eighteenth-century England exercised
administrative power in the form of general warrants, writs of assistance (e.g., authorizing
customs searches).16 In colonial America, writs of assistance—that is, general search warrants—
were a major grievance that spurred the colonies to declare independence. 17
One of the first statutes explicitly authorizing agency investigations was the act creating
the Steamboat Inspection Service in 1838,18 followed by the Interstate Commerce Commission
Act in 1887.19 The courts struggled with what oversight to exercise over agency investigations. 20
The Supreme Court initially viewed with skepticism agencies’ ability to issue subpoenas, even
upon congressional delegation.21 The majority opinion in Harriman v. Interstate Commerce
Commission limited administrative subpoenas to “the cases where the sacrifice of privacy is
necessary—those where the investigations concern a specific breach of law.” 22 The Court
reinforced the notions that agency investigative acts would be scrutinized carefully, by
denouncing a “general, roving, offensive, inquisitorial, compulsory investigation, conducted by a
commission without any allegations, upon no fixed principles, and governed by no rules of law,
or of evidence, and no restrictions except its own will, or caprice.” 23 Into the 1920s, the Court

14

John A. Hamill, Sr., EPA Administrative Investigative Tools: An Inside Perspective, 4 J.
ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 85, 86–87 (1989) (discussing how writs were “an executive, not a judicial,
invention,” arising after the Norman conquest of 1066 and commonly issued by the King’s
chancellor and other administrative officials).
15
Osmond K. Fraenkel, Concerning Searches and Seizures, 34 HARV. L. REV. 361, 362 (1921).
16
Philip Hamburger, Early Prerogative and Administrative Power: A Response to Paul Craig,
81 MO. L. REV. 939, 952 (2016).
17
Davis, supra note 13, at 1111–14.
18
5 Stat. 304 (1838). This act provided for inspections of hulls, boilers, and the like. Id. §§ 3–6;
see Jerry L. Mashaw, Administration and “The Democracy”: Administrative Law from Jackson
to Lincoln, 1829-1861, 117 YALE L.J. 1568, 1633 (2008).
19
KRISTIN E. HICKMAN & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 8.1 (6th ed.
2019) (citing 24 Stat. 379, 383 (1887)).
20
Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Administrative War, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1343, 1401–08
(2014); Donald R.C. Pongrace, Requirement of Notice of Third-Party Subpoenas Issued in SEC
Investigations: A New Limitation on the Administrative Subpoena Power, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 701,
709–16 (1984) (discussing how the Supreme Court initially erected a high hurdle for agencies to
issue administrative subpoenas); HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra note 19, § 8.1 (similar).
21
Donald R.C. Pongrace, Requirement of Notice of Third-Party Subpoenas Issued in SEC
Investigations: A New Limitation on the Administrative Subpoena Power, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 701,
709–10 (1984).
22
Harriman v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 211 U.S. 407, 419–20 (1908).
23
Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1, 27 (1936) (quoting In re Pac. Ry. Comm’n, 32 F. 241, 263
(C.C.N.D. Cal. 1887)).
4
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reiterated its disapproval of “fishing expeditions into private papers on the possibility that they
may disclose evidence of crime.24
But the Supreme Court’s attitude shifted after the New Deal established new and varied
agencies with complex missions.25 After World War II, and in near-contemporaneity with the
enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, the Court decided a body of cases that
recalibrated the baseline judicial scrutiny of agency investigations as highly deferential. These
seminal cases—which are examined in depth by this Article—include Oklahoma Press
Publishing Co. v. Walling26 and United States v. Morton Salt Co.27
In Oklahoma Press Publishing, the U.S. Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division
issued subpoenas to two newspaper publishers it was investigating for violating the Fair Labor
Standards Act.28 The publishers resisted the subpoenas, arguing that the Division failed to
comply with the Fourth Amendment and demonstrate the probable cause necessary to enforce
the subpoenas.29 The Supreme Court rejected that argument and dismissed the publishers’
concerns about executive “general fishing expeditions into [their] books, records and papers, in
order to secure evidence that they have violated the Act,” holding that “the records in these cases
present no question of actual search and seizure” but were only “constructive” searches. 30 For
such constructive searches, the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause requirement was satisfied
simply “by the court’s determination that the investigation is authorized by Congress, is for a
purpose Congress can order and the documents sought are relevant to the inquiry.” 31 Oklahoma
Press Publishing thus ruled that the Fourth Amendment protects regulated parties only so far as
Congress has explicitly limited agencies’ subpoena authorities. 32 Because the Fair Labor
Standards Act’s “language leaves no room to doubt that Congress intended to authorize just what
the Administrator did and sought have the courts do,” the publishers’ claims failed. 33 The
opinion also took particular note of the “corporate character” of the publishers’ records, implying
that the Fourth Amendment’s protections were especially attenuated in that circumstance. 34
Justice Murphy dissented alone, inveighing against all uses of administrative subpoenas and
alluding to King George III as he worried administrative subpoenas were vulnerable to
“[e]xcessive use or abuse of authority.”35
The Supreme Court returned to review the lawfulness of agency warrants four years later
in Morton Salt Co., this time in a challenge to a Federal Trade Commission order requiring salt
24

FTC v. Am. Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 306 (1924).
Davis, supra note 13, at 1122.
26
Okla. Press Pub’g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 209 (1946).
27
United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950).
28
Okla. Press Pub’g Co., 327 U.S. at 189.
29
Id. at 189–90.
30
Id. at 194–95, 202–05.
31
Id. at 209.
32
Id. at 197–202.
33
Id. at 198.
34
Id. at 204–08.
35
Id. at 218–19 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
25

5
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producers and trade associations to file various and comprehensive reports and statements. 36 The
salters argued that the Commission’s order violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. 37
Building off of Oklahoma Press Publishing, including its dim view of the robustness of business
associations’ constitutional rights in this context, the Court held that “neither incorporated nor
unincorporated associations can plead an unqualified right to conduct their affairs in secret.” 38
“Of course,” the Court recognized, the Constitution imposes some limits on what the
Commission could demand.39 In addition to the limitations found in Oklahoma Press
Publishing—that the type of agency request must be authorized by statute and the specific
agency request must be “reasonably relevant”—the Supreme Court held that “the demand [must
be] not too indefinite.”40 The Court summarily found that the Commission’s order, on its face,
met those standards.41 Finally, the Court faulted the salters for not complaining directly to the
Commission and asking it to modify the order: before quashing agency investigative acts as
“arbitrarily excessive,” courts “may expect the supplicant to have made reasonable efforts before
the Commission itself to obtain reasonable conditions.” 42
These two decisions had the effect of “further legitimizing the routine use of
administrative subpoenas.”43 This regime was ushered in by new Justices with a more hospitable
view of government intervention.44 The Supreme Court has not in recent years squarely
addressed this issue or the standards that should apply to judicial review of agency investigatory
techniques.45 Although the Supreme Court has not in recent years taken up the matter squarely,
it has not done so for a lack of petitions for a writ of certiorari. Several have been filed in the
years since Morton Salt, asking the Court to overrule or diminish parts of that jurisprudence. 46
B. Defining Agency Investigative Acts
The postwar Supreme Court cases involve perhaps the quintessential agency investigative
act, subpoenas. But subpoenas are just one example of an agency investigative act. A proper
study of investigations requires us to define what agency investigative acts are, precisely. The
academy and courts have not coalesced on a comprehensive definition of an agency investigative
act. The Attorney General’s 1941 report on administrative procedure remarked, “Much that
36

United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 636–37 (1950).
Id. at 651.
38
Id. at 652.
39
Id. at 652, 653.
40
Id. at 652.
41
Id. at 653.
42
Id.
43
Cuéllar, supra note 20, at 1404.
44
HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra note 19, § 8.1.
45
See, e.g., id. § 8.2.
46
See, e.g., Pet. for Writ of Certiorari, Koresko v. Chao, 2006 WL 1455400 (2006) (“Morton
Salt and Powell are decades old, predating this Court’s jurisprudence on privacy rights.
Subsequent statutory law has worn away the main thread of the holdings—that government
inquiries must be presumed legitimate.”).
37

6
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occurs at a hearing or conference is conditioned by the investigation of the problem which may
have preceded it, or of which the hearing may be a part.” 47 Once Congress enacted the APA,
which carried forward many existing administrative law practices, Professor Kenneth Culp Davis
offered, “The Administrative Procedure Act to the contrary notwithstanding, administrative
proceedings are not limited to rule-making, adjudication, and licensing. Some administrative
proceedings are investigations—proceedings designed to produce information.” 48
The Supreme Court has weighed in by providing a negative definition of an
administrative investigation, concluding that an investigation is not a final agency action. 49 An
investigation “is not a definitive statement of position . . . [but only] represents a threshold
determination that further inquiry is warranted . . .”50 The APA obliquely references “nonpublic
investigatory proceeding[s]” and “investigative act[s],” 51 but “provides no statutory definition or
classification of different kinds of investigations.” 52
Nor do dictionaries provide helpful definitions. Webster’s defines “investigate”—and the
word’s derivatives, “investigatory,” “investigator,” and “investigation”—to mean “a systematic
examination.”53 Other courts have turned to Black’s Law Dictionary’s definition, which focuses
on the objective of the investigation: “[t]he activity of trying to find out the truth about
something.”54 The Department of Justice has defined “regulatory investigations” similarly:
“‘[R]egulatory investigations’… generally have as their objective regulatory compliance by
private parties.”55 This demonstrates a parallel framework to Justice Stewart’s “I know it when I
see it” approach.56
Although there is no general, executive branch definition of administrative investigation,
certain organic statutes give agencies binding definitions in some contexts. For example, the
Antitrust Civil Process Act provides: “[t]he term ‘antitrust investigation’ means any inquiry
conducted by any antitrust investigator for the purpose of ascertaining whether any person is or
47

ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE 111 (1941).
48
Davis, supra note 13, at 1111; see also David C. Shonka, Responding to the Government’s
Civil Investigations, 15 SEDONA CONF. J. 1, 1 (2014).
49
FTC v. Std. Oil Co. of Cal., 449 U.S. 232, 241 (1980).
50
Id.
51
5 U.S.C. §§ 555(c), 554(d).
52
John A. Hamill, Sr., EPA Administrative Investigative Tools: An Inside Perspective, 4 J.
ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 85, 88 (1989) (footnotes omitted).
53
Doe v. Rogers, 139 F. Supp. 3d 120, 137-38 (D.D.C. 2015).
54
MusclePharm Corp. v. Liberty Ins. Underwriters, Inc., 712 F. App’x 745, 755 (10th Cir. 2017)
(citing Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) and distinguishing “regulatory investigation”
from “proceeding.”).
55
U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, Inspector General Authority to Conduct
Regulatory Investigations, 13 U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel 54, 54 n.1, 1989 WL 595865, at *1
n.1 (Mar. 9, 1989).
56
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J. concurring) (applying such an
approach to pornography).
7
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has been engaged in any antitrust violation or in any activities in preparation for a merger,
acquisition, joint venture, or similar transaction, which, if consummated, may result in an
antitrust violation.”57 Similar statutory definitions for civil administrative investigation exist for
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”)58 and the Federal Trade Commission
(“FTC”).59 These definitions, too, are only general.
We thus offer a definition of agency investigative acts: Executive branch agency
exercises of civil examination or inquiry authority, taken in the absence of positive APA
procedures, that carry the perceived, eventual, or actual threat of compulsion. 60 We draw the
term from the APA, which uses it, albeit glancingly and without definition. 61
Deconstructing such definition requires mapping agency behavior that precedes “agency
action” as normatively understood in the APA in 5 U.S.C. § 704. 62 The agency must be acting
on some kind of formal or informal complaint, tip, internal targeting, or a defined trigger point,
at which point the agency researches the facts necessary to sustain an agency action and decides
whether to initiate such an action.63 If the type of agency action is an adjudication, then the
investigation could enable the decision whether to adjudicate by enforcement against a specific
party. Here, investigation targets are not (yet) respondents or defendants in agency or civil
actions, but akin to third-party witnesses, including third-party witnesses on notice of their
potential status as a party-defendant. 64 The goal is to determine whether agency action that
would trigger normative § 704 finality is warranted.
Our definition presumes that the purpose of agency investigation is to see whether some
agency action may eventually be warranted, excepting when the investigation is preordained to
produce a discrete outcome. This comports with the Supreme Court’s 1946 statement that
agency investigations aim to “discovery and procure evidence” to see if that evidence “should
justify” bringing a charge or complaint. 65 It also comports with the Court’s later distinction
57

15 U.S.C. § 1311(c).
12 U.S.C. § 5561. The Supreme Court held that it was unconstitutional for the CFPB’s
director to be removed only for cause. See Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct.
2183 (2020). Although the case focused primarily on the authorities of inferior officers of the
United States, it arose in the context of CFPB attempting to enforce its civil investigatory
authority against the respondent. Id. at *6–7.
59
15 U.S.C. § 57b-1.
60
This definition comports with the only other attempted definition in the literature of which we
are aware, Professor Davis’s comment that investigations are “designed to produce information.”
Davis, supra note 13, at 1111.
61
5 U.S.C. § 555(c).
62
ASIMOW, supra note 8.
63
E.g., 7 U.S.C. § 193(a) (describing the procedure for the Department of Agriculture to
investigate, hear, and fine packers and swine contractors who have violated or may have violated
the Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921”).
64
FTC v. Compagnie De Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300, 1310–11 (D.C. Cir.
1980).
65
Okla. Press Pub’g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 201 (1946).
58

8
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between “determinations of a quasi-judicial nature”—i.e., adjudications—and “nonadjudicative,
fact-finding investigations.”66 This definitional prong leaves out agency movement where
agency action is remote, impossible, or forsworn. For example, when the government seeks
demographic data for the decennial census, the request’s purpose is not to make agency action. 67
A variety of sources can spark an investigation. Some agencies could conduct an
investigation as an exercise of its own discretion and on its own initiative. For example, the
CFPB may issue civil investigative demands to collect information “before the institution of any
proceedings.”68 The agency might do so simply upon reading a news story, 69 or just “merely on
suspicion.”70 The agency might receive a tip or notification, perhaps from an inspector general or
another federal agency like the Department of Justice. 71 This may be because a private party
files a charge with the agency and the agency is required to investigate (often within a
timeframe) whether to file an administrative complaint. 72 The agency may commence an
investigation upon direction from the President. 73 Congress may also issue a directive to
investigate,74 for example, through a statute directing an agency to adopt rules within a certain
number of days on a particular subject, which requires the agency to investigate what the rule
should be.75

66

Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 445–46 (1960).
See 13 U.S.C. §§ 141, 181 (authorizing the Census Bureau to conduct decennial censuses and
interim inquiries).
68
12 U.S.C. § 5562(c)(1). Each demand must “state the nature of the conduct constituting the
alleged violation which is under investigation and the provision of law applicable to such
violation.” Id. § 5562(c)(2).
69
Shonka, supra note 48, at 2.
70
United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57 (1964).
71
E.g., FED. ELECTION COMM’N, GUIDEBOOK FOR COMPLAINANTS AND RESPONDENTS ON THE
FEC ENFORCEMENT PROCESS 8–9 (2012), https://transition.fec.gov/em/respondent_guide.pdf.
72
8 U.S.C. § 1324b(d)(2) (the U.S. Department of Justice’s Civil Rights Division’s Immigrant
and Employee Rights Section, which receives and investigates complaints of unfair immigrationrelated employment practices); see also id. § 1324b(d)(1) (also permitting that Section to
unilaterally investigate and file charges); 14 C.F.R. § 13.5(g)–(i) (similar, for Federal Aviation
Administration complaints); 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(1); 11 C.F.R. § 111.4 (similar, for FEC
complaints); 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (similar, for National Labor Relations Board complaints).
73
E.g., Zeke Miller, President Trump Orders Intelligence Agencies to ‘Fully Cooperate’ With
Investigation into Mueller Probe, TIME (May 24, 2019), https://time.com/5595248/donaldtrump-intelligence-russia/; Kaveh Waddell, Obama Orders Investigation into Election-Related
Hacking, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 9, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/12/obama-orders-full-review-of-electionrelated-hacking/510149/.
74
Shonka, supra note 48, at 2.
75
E.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 2056c(a); 22 U.S.C. § 5504(a); 25 U.S.C. § 1406(b), (c).
67
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Some agencies, like the Internal Revenue Service 76 and Federal Election Commission,77
exercise express discretion under their organic statute, commonly in the form of compliance
checks or audits. Such an investigation may follow a telephone call received on a tip line, a
whistleblower complaint, or some reason for the agency to suspect a violation. But even if the
agency does not have a discrete reason to audit a party, it may employ a random audit 78 to
decrease the probability that violators can strategically evade enforcement. 79 The audit might not
be completely random. An agency might pay attention to particular industries or fields under its
regulatory purview.80
Once the agency elects to investigate, there are a number of possible outcomes, all of
which (under our definition) carry the perceived threat or actual consequence of compulsion.
The agency may decide to commence an adjudication or rulemaking, although the adjudication
may be the agency finding a liability yet declining to seek an immediate remedy. 81 Conversely,
the agency might decline to commence an adjudication or rulemaking for the time being. An
outcome from an agency investigation that yields an agency action could be a compliance action.
For example, a grant-distributing agency must comply with its organic statute and the Office of
Management and Budget’s various circulars via audits for compliance purposes. Sometimes,
there is the authority to engage in an audit outside the periodic time requirement in response to
allegations or suspicion of fraud or bad action.
An adjudication or rulemaking does not necessarily need to be the goal, however. An
agency could investigate for the purpose of discovering and logging “informal enforcement
actions.” For example, the EPA maintains Enforcement and Compliance History Online, which
is a searchable, publicly accessible database about corporate violations, provides data on
“informal enforcement actions.”82 An agency investigation might also result in management
audits, where agencies work with regulated parties to ensure that regulated parties are prepared
to follow the law. Of course, to fall within our definition of “agency investigation,” the
interaction between the agency and the regulated parties must at some point carry at minimum
the perceived threat of coercion.
So, what is not an agency civil investigation? Negative definitions are helpful because
the APA does not precisely or exhaustively define all forms of agency conduct or behavior.
76

Audit Techniques Guides, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/businesses/smallbusinesses-self-employed/audit-techniques-guides-atgs (last visited Dec. 17, 2020) (industryspecific audit guidances).
77
26 U.S.C. §§ 9007(a), 9008(g), 9038(a).
78
Chaves Cnty. Home Health Serv., Inc. v. Sullivan, 931 F.2d 914, 916 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
79
See United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972); Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Auditing
Executive Discretion, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 227, 299 (2006).
80
Audit Techniques Guides, supra note 76.
81
See, e.g., Rhea Lana, Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor, 824 F.3d 1023 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
82
Enforcement and Compliance History Online, U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, https://echo.epa.gov/
(last visited Dec. 17, 2020). An example page is here: Detailed Facility Report,
https://echo.epa.gov/detailed-facility-report?fid=110070032218 (last visited Dec. 17, 2020).
10
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Indeed, the APA is replete with negative definitions.83 The APA also hints at investigative
functions without defining, positively or negatively, that term. 84 Some courts have implied—
appropriately so, in our view—at investigative acts being categorically distinct from other types
of “agency action,” including adjudications or rules.85
Proceedings with positive APA procedures like rulemakings or adjudications are not
agency investigations; our definition does not equate to everything leading up to, or just short of,
the completion of rulemakings or adjudications. For instance, we define agency investigations to
exclude pre-decisional adjudicational and rulemaking processes where the decision to charge a
party has been formally made and an impartial decisionmaker now has jurisdiction over the
case.86 Although a neutral agency decisionmaker conducting hearings as part of the formal
adjudication process is literally “investigating” a claim and assessing whether the complaint has
merit, we exclude these types of proceedings because the agency is acting in a quasi-judicial
role. Such proceedings feature fewer problems, as we discuss below in Part V, and objections to
agency abuses committed during the adjudicatory or rulemaking process can often be raised to an
impartial decisionmaker. Our definition thus requires that there be a lack of APA positive
procedures, so the process of rulemaking and adjudication is not an “investigation.” 87
An agency investigation could result in collateral issues during and following agency
action. Instead of the agency deciding whom to pursue or whether to pursue someone, the
agency could be deciding the size of a penalty. For example, the Office of Thrift Supervision
may assess civil fines against a party that violates banking laws or regulations or breaches a
fiduciary duty. In assessing fines, the agency, by statute, must consider mitigating factors like
the size of the subpoenaed party’s financial resources. 88

83

The APA has a negative definition of informal adjudication as adjudication that is not formal.
5 U.S.C. § 554(a); see also SecurityPoint Holdings, Inc. v. Transp. Sec. Admin., 769 F.3d 1184,
1187–88 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (applying § 555(e) to informal adjudications). Similarly, “agency” is a
general definition with a number of negative carveouts. 5 U.S.C. § 551(1).
84
See, e.g., id. § 554(d).
85
United States v. W.H. Hodges & Co., 533 F.2d 276, 278 (5th Cir. 1976) (per curiam); see
Sierra Club v. Peterson, 185 F.3d 349, 366 n.25 (5th Cir. 1999), on reh’g, 228 F.3d 559 (5th Cir.
2000) (dicta).
86
We have also structured our definition to exclude “enforcement actions.” For example, in the
SEC context, enforcement actions mean all the legal proceedings that the commission brings that
would normatively be considered “final agency action” under the APA. Urska Velikonja,
Reporting Agency Performance: Behind the SEC’s Enforcement Statistics, 101 CORNELL L. REV.
901, 903–04 (2016).
87
This is because the APA provides the general contours of process for rulemaking and
adjudication. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 556, 557.
88
See 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(2); In re Sealed Case (Admin. Subpoena), 42 F.3d 1412, 1416 (D.C.
Cir. 1994).
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Our affirmative definition covers only civil agency investigations. Criminal
investigations by agencies are a separate inquiry beyond the scope of this Article. 89 Additional
constitutional safeguards apply if the investigation is for a criminal offense, including if a civil
investigation shifts into a criminal investigation.90 That said, criminal investigations are often
intertwined with civil investigations and are frequently the outgrowth of an investigation that
may have begun with a purely civil aim.
Our definition excludes non-coercive action.91 While an agency investigation can be
non-coercive or non-intrusive, this Article concerns only coercive or intrusive actions—or
actions carrying the threat of possible future coercion, or the perception of coercion—such that
the respondent would want to challenge them. Purely voluntary requests, such as civil
extradition mutual legal assistance treaty information requests from foreign countries or Hague
Convention requests for evidence, implicate fewer of the concerns we identify later on, and also
permit a brighter line by their exclusion. We do recognize that at some point, a significant
investment in non-coercive factfinding can morph into an investigation. The line can be subtle
and vary among and within agencies.
Finally, our definition of investigative act excludes investigations by entities that are not
“agencies.” To make that determination, we look to the familiar APA definition of an “agency,”
which carves out Congress, the courts, state and territorial governmental entities, and so forth. 92
Thus, this Article does not examine investigations by Article I actors or Article III courts. 93 We
also exclude certain entities from the APA definition that courts have construed as non-agencies,
such as Presidential czars within the Executive Office of the President.

89

Criminal investigations merit a separate investigation, but are typically associated with federal
employees classified under the U.S. Office of Personnel Management’s Series GS-1811. See
OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MGMT., JOB FAMILY POSITION CLASSIFICATION STANDARD FOR
ADMINISTRATIVE WORK IN THE JUSTICE AND NATIONAL SECURITY GROUP, 1800, at 12–14,
https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/classification-qualifications/classifying-generalschedule-positions/standards/1800/1800a.pdf (last visited Dec. 17, 2020). Employees classified
as 1811 investigators “supervise, lead, or perform work involving planning, conduct, or
managing investigations related to alleged or suspected criminal violations of Federal laws.”
U.S. OFFICE PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, HANDBOOK OF OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS AND FAMILIES
109 (Dec. 2018), https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/classificationqualifications/classifying-general-schedule-positions/occupationalhandbook.pdf.
90
See generally Risa Berkower, Sliding Down A Slippery Slope? The Future Use of
Administrative Subpoenas in Criminal Investigations, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2251 (2005).
91
Cf., e.g., United States v. Bailey, 228 F.3d 341, 348 (4th Cir. 2000) (administrative subpoenas
“commence[] an adversary process”).
92
5 U.S.C. § 551(1).
93
See, e.g., Matt Zapotosky, Judiciary Closes Investigation of Sexual Misconduct Allegations
against Retired Judge Alex Kozinski, WASH. POST (Feb. 5, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/judiciary-closes-investigation-ofsexual-misconduct-allegations-against-retired-judge-alex-kozinski/2018/02/05/e3a94bb8-0ac011e8-95a5-c396801049ef_story.html?utm_term=.e6d743a65704.
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In sum, an investigative act lies early on a spectrum of total agency behavior. Agency
activity progresses from a triggering event to an investigation, then to the beginning of an
“agency action.” If the action is adjudication, then the investigation ends with the allegation of a
legal violation. If the action is rulemaking, then the investigation ends with the commencement
of a rulemaking process.
III. AGENCY INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES AND METHODS
Before understanding agency investigation norms and the appropriate legal response to
agency investigations, it is necessary to understand precisely how agencies accomplish their
investigations. First, agencies often can issue subpoenas to inspect documents and other physical
materials.94 Some agencies issue national security letters 95 or “civil investigative demands”96 on
responding parties.97 Other organic statutes endow agencies with the authority to conduct audits,
by which the government gains documents or information. 98 Congress has not given any agency
the power to enforce such orders with contempt powers, although some state courts have
permitted state agencies the power to punish disobedience with contempt. 99
Second, many agencies can inspect property or enter premises, sometimes for the purpose
of inspecting records.100 The organic statute does not need to explicitly authorize searches, as
courts will sometimes infer an agency’s ability to search. 101
94

See generally LAFAVE, 2 SEARCH & SEIZURE § 4.13 n.4 (5th ed.) (listing examples); see also,
e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 449m (Department of Agriculture); 15 U.S.C. § 1311 (Department of Justice
Antitrust Division); 18 U.S.C. § 923(g)(1)(B), (C) (Attorney General may inspect the records of
certain licensed firearm importers, manufacturers, and dealers); 26 U.S.C. §§ 5123(a) (IRS),
§ 7609 (IRS third-party summonses); 29 U.S.C. § 521(a) (Secretary of Labor); 49 U.S.C.
§ 32910(a)(1)(A) (Secretary of Transportation and the Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency); 52 U.S.C. § 20703 (Attorney General may inspect and copy certain records
related to federal elections); Belle Fourche Pipeline Co. v. United States, 554 F. Supp. 1350,
1359 (D. Wyo. 1983). See also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, REPORT TO
CONGRESS ON THE USE OF ADMINISTRATIVE SUBPOENA AUTHORITIES BY EXECUTIVE BRANCH
AGENCIES AND ENTITIES apps. (2002),
https://www.justice.gov/archive/olp/rpt_to_congress.htm#4.
95
18 U.S.C. §§ 2709, 3511; see Doe v. Gonzales, 546 U.S. 1301 (2005) (Ginsburg, J., in
chambers).
96
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Accrediting Council for Indep. Colls. & Schs., 854 F.3d 683,
688 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
97
See also James E. Pfander & Daniel D. Birk, Article III Judicial Power, the Adverse-Party
Requirement, and Non-Contentious Jurisdiction, 124 YALE L.J. 1346, 1379–80 (2015) (tracing a
since-rejected view of Justice Field that agencies should conduct investigations without the aid
of federal courts, and thus without the aid of the judiciary’s subpoena power).
98
Cuéllar, supra note 79, at 252–5876–82.
99
HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra note 19, § 8.2.
100
E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2065(a) (Federal Trade Commission); 26 U.S.C. § 5123(b) (IRS); 30 U.S.C.
§ 1267(a) (Department of the Interior); 42 U.S.C. § 7542(b)(2) (Environmental Protection
13
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Third, agencies may make voluntary requests for interview or documents. 102 Agencies
can issue such requests against third parties, perhaps before the investigative learns that it is
under investigation. In doing so, agencies can liaise with state and local agencies. 103 Of course,
if these requests do not carry the perceived, eventual, or actual threat of compulsion for the party
under investigation, then they lie outside our definition of investigative action.
Finally, an agency may engage in noncoercive monitoring practices. These include
checking databases, public or private; 104 maintaining interagency lines of communication; 105
setting up a tip line;106 conducting laboratory work, as with the Department of Commerce’s
National Institute of Standards and Technology;107 and even reading the mail from the public
such as an IRS Form 13909 Tax-Exempt Organization Complaint (Referral). One source of
information at an agency’s disposal is tips, inspector general findings, periodic reports from
grantees, audits, charges, and complaints that it may receive at low to no cost. 108 Passive
practices require something more than merely watching the news or parsing the internet. 109 Such
monitoring practices, though facially non-coercive, can carry coercive tendencies if coupled with
a subjectively-inferred threat of firmer action.
Congress must authorize an agency, at least implicitly, to use these tools. The APA
contemplates agencies having such power and provides an agency with power to make “process,
requirement of a report, inspection, or other investigative act or demand,” including a subpoena

Agency); 49 U.S.C. § 60120(a)(2) (Secretary of Transportation may request the Attorney
General bring a civil action to allow for on-site inspections to enforce 49 U.S.C. §§ 60101–
60141, regarding pipeline safety).
101
E.g., Blackie’s House of Beef, Inc. v. Castillo, 659 F.2d 1211, 1221–22 (D.C. Cir. 1981); see
Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 233 (1986).
102
E.g., Kerry Flynn, Why the FBI Is Investigating Media Buying Practices, DIGIDAY (Oct. 15,
2018), https://digiday.com/marketing/fbi-investigating-media-buying-practices/.
103
E.g., 29 U.S.C. § 211(b) (Department of Labor may use the services of state and local labor
agencies with consent); see also 27 U.S.C. § 202(f) (Department of Treasury may work with
“any department or other agency of the Government” to enforce the Federal Alcohol
Administration Act).
104
Case Development and Limited Review Investigations, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Employee
Benefits Sec. Admin., https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/about-ebsa/ouractivities/enforcement/oe-manual/case-development-and-limited-review-investigations (last
visited Dec. 17, 2020).
105
Id.
106
E.g., HSI Tip Form, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, https://www.ice.gov/webform/hsitip-form (last updated Aug. 23, 2018).
107
15 U.S.C. §§ 271–281a; see Davis, supra note 13, at 1114.
108
E.g., 7 U.S.C. § 193(a); 8 U.S.C. § 274a(b)(1); 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.
109
See Davis, supra note 13, at 1114. For more information on how agencies use internet
evidence in their adjudications, see ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES,
INTERNET EVIDENCE IN AGENCY ADJUDICATION (2019), https://www.acus.gov/researchprojects/internet-evidence-agency-adjudication.
14

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3757677

WORKING DRAFT—JANUARY 2021

if “authorized by law.”110 However, the APA does not independently empower agencies to issue
subpoenas or inspect property.111
Rather, the primary source of an agency’s investigative authority is its organic statutes.
The authority of an administrative agency to investigate is created solely by statute. 112 By one
count, “Congress has passed more than 300 administrative subpoena statutes grant[ing] some
form of administrative subpoena authority to most federal agencies.” 113 But creating some
tension with that fundament, the Supreme Court held in Dow Chemical Co. v. United States that
“[r]egulatory or enforcement authority generally carries with it all the modes of inquiry and
investigation traditionally employed or useful to execute the authority granted.” 114 Dow
Chemical does not require an agency endowed with investigatory or enforcement authority “to
identify explicitly each and every technique that may be used in the course of executing the
statutory mission.”115 Courts have used this language—sometimes alongside an organic statute’s
legislative history116—to permit certain modes of investigatory inspection or searches that are not
specifically authorized by statute.117
Expansive readings of this sort are sometimes necessary, as organic statutes often impose
no textual constraints on the investigative techniques they may use. For example, Congress has
permitted the Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division Administrator to broadly
“investigate such facts, conditions, practices, or matters as he may deem necessary or appropriate
to determine whether any person has violated any provision of those chapter, or which may aid

110

5 U.S.C. § 555(c), (d).
ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 67 (1947) (“It
should be emphasized that [this] relates only to an existing subpoena power conferred upon
agencies; it does not grant power to issue subpoenas to agencies which are not so empowered by
other statutes.”); United States v. Sec. State Bank & Trust, 473 F.2d 638, 642 (5th Cir. 1973).
112
Peters v. United States, 853 F.2d 692, 696 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing 3 B. MEZINES, J. STEIN & J.
GRUFF, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 20.02 (1988)); Univ. of Richmond v. Bell, 543 F. Supp. 321,
332 (E.D. Va. 1982) (“[N]o inherent investigatory authority exists in a government agency but
only such authority as is granted by statute.”); Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Accrediting
Council for Indep. Colls. & Schs., 854 F.3d 683, 690 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“An administrative
agency’s authority to issue subpoenas ‘is created solely by statute.’”).
113
Robert A. Mikos, Can the States Keep Secrets from the Federal Government?, 161 U. PA. L.
REV. 103, 117 (2012) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Subpoena
Authority, STANFORD UNIV. & ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES,
https://acus.law.stanford.edu/reports/subpoena (last visited Dec. 17, 2020).
114
Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 233 (1986).
115
Id..
116
See, e.g., Boliden Metech, Inc. v. United States, 695 F. Supp. 77, 81 (D.R.I. 1988) (citing
Toxic Substances Control Act, Conf. Rep. S. 3149, 94th Cong., 2d Session, reprinted in 1976
U.S. Code Cong. and Admin. News 4491, 4572–73).
117
Nat’l-Standard Co. v. Adamkus, 881 F.2d 352, 362 (7th Cir. 1989) (background sampling,
although not specified in statute, was permissible under 42 U.S.C. § 6927(a)).
111
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in the enforcement of the provisions of this chapter.” 118 Similar expansive authority is held by
the Office of Foreign Asset Control,119 the Drug Enforcement Administration,120 and the U.S.
Postal Service.121 These textually broad delegations of investigatory authority provide little
constraint to agencies’ exercise of discretion in utilizing investigatory tools.
IV.

CONSTRAINTS ON AGENCY INVESTIGATIONS

There are several legal levers that check overzealous exercises of agency investigative
authority with varying degrees of success. They include tools under the U.S. Constitution,
Administrative Procedure Act and other applicable statutes and regulations. These legal levers
tend to sort into a binary hard versus soft paradigm. “Hard” checks are constraints on
investigative acts that can be applied more directly by parties aggrieved by investigative acts,
such as Fourth Amendment challenges to the relevancy of an agency investigative act. “Soft”
checks are constraints that include the articles of the U.S. Constitution embodying the doctrine of
the separation of powers, congressional oversight, public pressure, executive or agency selfconstraint, and agency culture.
A. Constitutional Constraints
i. Constitutional Civil Liberties
The Founders did not contemplate the modern administrative state and the complex civil
society that it regulates.122 The administrative state, which has grown rapidly since the New
Deal era, “has seemingly become an irresistible force” which “has collided with what at first
were apparently immovable constitutional principles concerning privacy, searches and seizures,
self-incrimination, and freedom from bureaucratic snooping.” 123 In the wake of that era, courts
have held repeatedly that the Constitution permits an agency to exercise investigative
functions.124
Nevertheless, the Constitution’s protections of civil liberties can serve to limit
meandering agency investigations. The primary guarantee of personal rights against improper
investigations is the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court has not interpreted these
protections to be robust in the civil setting. Generally, the agency’s power of access “is more
analogous to the Grand Jury, which does not depend on a case or controversy for power to get
118

29 U.S.C. §§ 211(a) (Fair Labor Standards Act), 2616(a) (for Family and Medical Leave,
same).
119
50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)–(2).
120
21 U.S.C. §§ 882(f), 880, 965; see 21 C.F.R. § 1316.03.
121
39 U.S.C. § 404(a)(6); see 39 C.F.R. § 233.1.
122
Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1233
(1994).
123
Davis, supra note 13.
124
See, e.g., FTC v. Cinderella Career & Finishing Schs., Inc., 404 F.2d 1308, 1315 (D.C. Cir.
1968) (collecting cases); In re McVane, 44 F.3d 1127, 1134 (2d Cir. 1995) (“Courts have
imposed few constitutional limitations on agencies’ power to issue administrative subpoenas.”).
16
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evidence, but can investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being violated, or even just
because it wants assurance that it is not.”125
The Fourth Amendment interacts differently with certain types of agency investigatory
tools. Starting with subpoenas, an agency subpoena, including to appear at a deposition, 126
conducts a “constructive search.” 127 The Fourth Amendment erects a number of hurdles on such
subpoenas, albeit of varying heights. In the modern Fourth Amendment jurisprudential
landscape, as first annunciated in United States v. Morton Salt Co. and Oklahoma Press
Publishing Co. v. Walling,128 a party may launch a “strictly limited” challenge to an agency’s
subpoena in enforcement proceedings. 129 The moving party must demonstrate that the agency
has failed any of four showings that favor the agency.

125

United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642–43 (1950).
16 C.F.R. § 3.33 (FTC permits depositions); Amendments to the Commission’s Rules of
Practice, 80 Fed. Reg. 60,091 (Oct. 5, 2015) (SEC proposing to allow depositions).
127
Okla. Press Pub’g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 202 (1946); cf. McLane Co. v. EEOC, 137 S.
Ct. 1159, 1169 (2017) (appearing to distance subpoena-quashing jurisprudence from the Fourth
Amendment by stating that Oklahoma Press “implied that the Fourth Amendment is the source
of the requirement that subpoena not be ‘too indefinite”).
128
Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. at 652; Okla. Press Pub’g Co., 327 U.S. at 209; see also United
States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 359 (1989) (in a more modern case, enforcing this requirement).
129
FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d at 871–72; Univ. of Medicine & Dentistry of N.J. v. Corrigan,
347 F.3d 57, 64 (3d Cir. 2003); accord Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Bay Shipbuilding
Corp., 668 F.2d 304, 330–31 (7th Cir. 1981) (calling administrative subpoena enforcement
proceedings “of a summary nature not requiring the issuance of process, hearing, findings of
fact, and the elaborate process of a civil suit” (quoting Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Nat’l
Labor Relations Bd., 122 F.2d 450, 451 (7th Cir. 1941))).
126
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The following chart summarizes the dimensions of these standards that we discuss,
below, follows:

Fourth Amendment Showings Necessary to Challenge
Pre-Adjudication Civil Investigatory Agency Subpoena
Standard
Requirements on Agency
Is the subpoena in the
 must be within authority
agency’s authority?
 cannot “plainly lack jurisdiction”
 cannot investigate “other wrongdoing, as yet unknown”
 must comply with all procedural requirements in its
organic statute and with its own regulations
 cannot be issued for improper purpose
 cannot be issued in bad faith
Is the subpoena “reasonably  agency’s own appraisal of relevancy, which “must be
relevant”?
accepted so long as it is not obviously wrong”
 may hinge on whether the target of investigation is a
person or a business association
Is the subpoena overbroad or  cannot be “too indefinite”
improper in scope?
 cannot be “unreasonably broad”
 must be “sufficiently limited in scope,” subject to federal
privilege law
Is the subpoena unduly
 cannot unduly burden the respondent
burdensome?
First, an agency subpoena must be within the agency’s authority to issue. 130 This
requirement is variously articulated as whether the agency “plainly lacks” jurisdiction. 131 That
is, an agency cannot simply serve a subpoena seeking information to investigate “other
wrongdoing, as yet unknown.”132 Relatedly, an agency must comply with all procedural
requirements in its organic statute and with its own regulations, 133 for example, if the statute
requires the agency to state the nature of its investigation and the law supposedly being
violated.134 An agency’s authority must extend not only to the type of investigatory tool used,
but also to the type of information sought. For example, an agency that holds the statutory
130

United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964); Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. at 652; Okla. Press
Pub’g Co., 327 U.S. at 209; see also United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 359 (1989) (in a more
modern case, enforcing this requirement).
131
NLRB v. Chapa de Indian Health Program, Inc., 316 F.3d 995 (9th Cir. 2003).
132
In re Sealed Case (Admin. Subpoena), 42 F.3d 1412, 1419 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
133
See United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954).
134
E.g., Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Accrediting Council for Indep. Colls. & Schs., 854 F.3d
683, 690 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
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authority only to subpoena information to determine liability cannot enforce a subpoena of
personal financial information for the purpose of assessing the individual’s net worth to
determine the cost-effectiveness of an investigation.135 This standard is rather lax. One circuit
holds that “[a]s long as the agency’s assertion of authority is not apocryphal, a procedurally
sound subpoena must be enforced.”136 The Supreme Court has confirmed that the assertion of
authority is jurisdictional in nature, and that the familiar Chevron137 deference is due to an
agency’s determination of its jurisdiction.138
Relatedly, the subpoena cannot be used for an improper purpose or in bad faith. 139 “Bad
faith” must be institutionalized bad faith—bad faith by individual agency actors is insufficient. 140
An example of “bad faith” could include “harassment of the recipient of the subpoena, or a
conscious attempt by the agency to pressure the recipient to settle a collateral dispute.” 141
However, it is worth noting that the “purpose” of the subpoena in the seminal case establishing
this requirement, United States v. Powell, was important because the agency at issue, the IRS,
could issue summons for only limited purposes. 142 Thus, the “improper purpose” requirement
might not be available to parties challenging every type of investigative act under every type of
organic statute.

135

Resolution Tr. Corp. v. Walde, 18 F.3d 943, 947–49 (D.C. Cir. 1994); see Katherine Scherb,
Administrative Subpoenas for Private Financial Records: What Protection for Privacy Does the
Fourth Amendment Afford?, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 1075, 1085–97 (summarizing case law). Note
that the D.C. Circuit does not view this ultra vires inquiry as being constitutional. Id. at 949.
136
United States v. Sturm, Roger & Co., 84 F.3d 1, 5–6 (1st Cir. 1996).
137
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
138
City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290 (2013). ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, supra note 111, at 69 (citing Endicott Johnson Corp. v.
Perkins, 317 U.S. 501 (1943); Okla. Press Pub’g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 1 86 (1946); “Nothing
the language of section 6(c) suggests any purpose to change this established rule.”). The
Attorney General’s Manual cited the fact that an earlier APA bill specifically entitled courts to
“determine all relevant questions of law raised by the parties, including the authority or
jurisdiction of the agency.” Id. However, that language did not make it into the enacted bill. Id.
Note that the Constitution, if not the APA, allows courts to hear certain challenges to an agency’s
jurisdiction, per post-1946 case law from the Supreme Court.
139
United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 58 (1964); Resolution Tr. Corp. v. Frates, 61 F.3d 962,
965 (D.C. Cir. 1995); see Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Accrediting Council for Indep. Colls. &
Schs., 854 F.3d 683, 689 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
140
United States v. LaSalle Nat’l Bank, 437 U.S. 298, 317–18 (1978); SEC v. WheelingPittsburgh Steel Corp., 648 F.2d 118, 125 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc); United States v. Markwood,
48 F.3d 969, 978 (6th Cir. 1995).
141
United States v. Markwood, 48 F.3d 969, 978 (6th Cir. 1995).
142
Powell, 379 U.S. at 49–51, 57–58.
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Second, the subpoena must be “reasonably relevant.” 143 This standard appears lax, too.
Because the “standard for judging relevancy in an investigatory proceeding is more relaxed than
in an adjudicatory one,”144 the court “defer[s] to the agency’s appraisal of relevancy, which
‘must be accepted so long as it is not obviously wrong.’” 145 The burden of showing irrelevance
lies with the responding party.146
The relevance test may hinge on whether the target of investigation is a person or a
business association. This distinction derives from the penumbraic right to privacy recognized
from, inter alia, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and from a statement in Morton Salt that
corporations “can claim no equality with individuals in the enjoyment of a right to privacy.” 147
This test is consistent with the APA’s House Judiciary Committee Report, which opined that an
agency “investigation must be substantially and demonstrably necessary to agency
operations.”148 The effect of this distinction may be a lower bar for the responding party to show
irrelevance,149 especially if the responding party is a third party who is not the target of the
agency’s investigation.150
Third, the subpoena must not be “too indefinite” 151 or “unreasonably broad,”152 and it
must be “sufficiently limited in scope.” 153 Federal privilege law governs the subpoena’s
scope.154

143

Powell, 379 U.S. 48; United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950); Okla. Press
Pub’g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 209 (1946); see also United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353,
359 (1989) (in a more modern case, enforcing this requirement).
144
Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Invention Submission Corp., 965 F.2d 1089, 1090 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
145
Resolution Tr. Corp. v. Walde, 18 F.3d 943, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
146
Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Invention Submission Corp., 965 F.2d at 1090.
147
338 U.S. at 652.
148
H. Rep. 1980 at 264 (May 3, 1946).
149
In re McVane, 44 F.3d 1127, 1137 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Harrington, 388 F.2d 520,
524 (2d Cir. 1968); cf. Doe v. United States, 253 F.3d 256, 270 (6th Cir. 2002); FDIC v. Garner,
126 F.3d 1138, 1143–44 (9th Cir. 1997).
150
In re McVane, 44 F.3d at 1137–38.
151
United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964); Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. at 652; Okla. Press
Pub’g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 209 (1946); see also United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353,
359 (1989) (in a more modern case, enforcing this requirement).
152
See, e.g., FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d at 881–82; N.L.R.B. v. Am. Med. Response, Inc.,
438 F.3d 188, 192 (2d Cir. 2006).
153
See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 544 (1967).
154
See, e.g., Linde Thomson Langworthy Kohn & Van Dyke, P.C. v. Resolution Tr. Corp., 5
F.3d 1508, 1513 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (citing FTC v. TRW, Inc., 628 F.2d 207, 210–11 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (FTC); Dole v. Milonas, 889 F.2d 885, 889 n.6 (9th Cir. 1989) (ERISA); United States v.
Schoenheinz, 548 F.2d 1389, 1390 (9th Cir. 1977) (IRS); Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633,
636 (2d Cir. 1962) (IRS)).
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Fourth, the subpoena cannot be “unduly burdensome.” 155 Once challenged, the burden is
on the agency to show that the subpoena does not impose undue burdens. 156 There are very few
cases in which a court has quashed a subpoena on this basis. 157
These showings are not needed until the subpoena is challenged in court; a judicial
warrant is not a condition precedent to a valid administrative subpoena. 158 To serve a subpoena
in the first place, an agency does not need probable cause 159 or reasonable suspicion.160 The
agency need only be “reasonable,” which means compliance with the above criteria. 161 Nor must
the agency “make a preliminary finding of liability before it can even initiate an
investigation.”162 One possible exception is that in the D.C. Circuit at least, an agency must
demonstrate an “articulable suspicion” of liability to enforce a subpoena for personal financial
information.163 The fact that probable cause in the criminal sense is not required provides
another incentive for agency investigators to start building their case with civil investigative
tools over criminal investigative tools.
Judicial review of agency subpoenas to determine compliance with the above criteria is
“strictly limited” on account of “the important governmental interest in the expeditious
investigation of possible unlawful activity.” 164 Courts “generally defer to an agency’s
interpretation of the scope of its own investigation.” 165 During the proceedings to quash, a court

155

See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 544 (1967); FCC v. Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d 862, 882 &
n.51 (D.C. Cir. 1977); FTC v. Church & Dwight Co., 665 F.3d 1312, 1316 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
156
EEOC v. Md. Cup Corp., 785 F.2d 471, 476 (4th Cir. 1986); EEOC v. Children’s Hosp. Med.
Ctr., 719 F.2d 1426, 1428 (9th Cir. 1983) (en banc). Cf. FTC v. Jim Walter Corp. 651 F.2d 251,
258 (5th Cir. 1981) (putting the burden on the affected party to show that compliance would
impose an unreasonable burden), abrogated on other grounds by Republic of Panama v. BCCI
Holdings (Lux.) S.A., 119 F.3d 935 (11th Cir. 1997).
157
EEOC v. Aon Consulting, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 2d 601, 603 (S.D. Ind. 2001) (subpoena unduly
burdensome, but conditioning enforcement on agency’s willingness to enter a confidentially
agreement).
158
Donovan v. Lone Steer, Inc., 464 U.S. 408, 415 (1984).
159
Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320–21 (1978); accord Camara v. Municipal Court
of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967); Okla. Press Pub’g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 209 (1946).
160
DeMasters v. Arend, 313 F.2d 88 (1963); United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632,
642–43 (1950).
161
United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 51 (1964).
162
In re Sealed Case (Admin. Subpoena), 42 F.3d 1412, 1416 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (citing FTC v.
Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d 862, 874 (D.C. Cir. 1977)).
163
Resolution Tr. Corp. v. Walde, 18 F.3d 943, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1994). The “articulable
suspicion” requirement also applies to determining an individual’s ability to pay a civil penalty.
In re Sealed Case (Admin. Subpoena), 42 F.3d 1412, 1417 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
164
U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n v. ASAT, Inc., 411 F.3d 245, 253 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (quoting FTC v.
Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d at 872).
165
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Accrediting Council for Indep. Colls. & Schs., 854 F.3d 683,
689 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (citing FTC v. Church & Dwight Co., 665 F.3d 1312, 1315–16 (D.C. Cir.
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will not hear substantive defenses that the investigated party may have to the underlying
investigation during its pendency.166 Arguments that the respondent is not within the agency’s
jurisdiction may typically only be made in defense of an administratively exhausted final
enforcement action.167 Another nigh insurmountable challenge is that an investigated party
might not know that an administrative subpoena went out to a third party, or might not have
standing to challenge the demand. 168
If the movant succeeds in enforcement proceedings, the remedy is unclear. Courts
sometimes imply that the agency need only reissue the problematic subpoena within certain
parameters169 and sometimes suggest they are executable as modified by the court. 170 Regardless
of the procedure the agency must undertake going forward, it is not difficult or burdensome for
the agency to quickly demand from a party the maximum amount of information that it is
allowed. Even when the subpoena is quashed, the remedy is often “limited to a judicial
requirement that the agency narrow the scope of the subpoena or identify the materials sought
with greater specificity.”171
Yet courts will, rarely, vindicate the right not to be investigated beyond statutory
authority once the investigation and then final agency action has concluded. One circuit court
held that the agency’s “comprehensive initial investigation . . . pursuant to the Secretary’s
standard practice exceeded his statutory authority from the outset.” 172 In fashioning a remedy,
that court simply struck the administrative findings of violations and awards against the
investigated party.173
The following chart summarizes the domain of administrative subpoenas before and after
the Supreme Court’s decisions in Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. and Morton Salt Co. The
chart compares these standards with the standards for grand jury subpoenas, another type of
2011); Dir., Office of Thrift Supervision v. Vinson & Elkins, LLP, 124 F.3d 1304, 1307 (D.C.
Cir. 1997)).
166
FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d at 879.
167
McLane Co. v. EEOC, 137 S. Ct. 1159, 1165 (2017); CSG Workforce Partners, LLC v.
Watson, 512 F. App’x 830, 836 (10th Cir. 2013); Donovan v. Shaw, 668 F.2d 985, 989 (8th Cir.
1982); FTC v. Ken Roberts Co., 276 F.3d 538, 584 (D.C. Cir. 2001); FMC v. Port of Seattle, 521
F.2d 431 (9th Cir. 1975); SEC v. Savage, 513 F.2d 188 (7th Cir. 1975).
168
Berkower, supra note 90, at 2275–76.
169
Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. TriCore Reference Labs., 849 F.3d 929, 943
(10th Cir. 2017) (“Our decision [quashing the EEOC’s subpoena] should not preclude the EEOC
from formulating a request for information to overcome the concerns discussed in this
opinion.”); see In re McVane, 44 F.3d 1127, 1137 (2d Cir. 1995) (implying same).
170
EEOC v. Aon Consulting, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 2d 601, 603 (S.D. Ind. 2001) (permitting
enforcement as modified by the court); EEOC v. United Air Lines, Inc., 287 F.3d 643, 653 (7th
Cir. 2002) (implying such).
171
HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra note 19, § 8.2 (citing United States v. Theodore, 479 F.2d 749 (4th
Cir. 1973)); cf. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 601 F.2d 162, 166 (5th Cir. 1979) (grand jury).
172
Greater Mo. Med. Pro Care Providers, Inc. v. Perez, 812 F.3d 1132, 1139 (8th Cir. 2015).
173
Id.
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investigative subpoena, albeit one used for a criminal investigative purpose.
Comparison of Procedural Protections for Administrative Subpoenas Before and After Oklahoma Press
Publishing Co. (1946) and Morton Salt Co. (1950), with Grand Jury Subpoenas
Issue
Admin. Investigation Admin. Investigations Grand Jury Subpoena
before 1950174
after 1950
Pre-issuance role of
No
No
Yes; convened under
Article III judge?
auspices of judge
Standard for issuance? Indeterminate;
Whether agency
Discretionary; “as it
potentially requiring
“plainly lacks”
considers
probable cause
jurisdiction
appropriate”175
Relevance?
Limited to cases
Must be “reasonably
Must be a reasonable
“where the
relevant”
possibility that category
investigations concern
of materials
a specific breach of the
Government seeks will
law”
produce information
relevant to general
subject of
investigation176
Breadth?
No roving “fishing
Cannot be “too
Limited by function
expeditions;” must
indefinite”
toward the possible
specify a reasonable
return of an
period of time and
indictment177
reasonably particular
subjects
Unduly burdensome
Yes
Yes
No; reasonableness and
standard?
oppressiveness
standard178
Bad faith basis
Not explicitly
No
No
acceptable?
Timing of challenge
Apparently postWhile a subpoena may Post-issuance as to the
issuance
be challenged before
subpoena,179 however,
final agency action, the grand juries cannot
investigation itself
“engage in arbitrary
otherwise may typically fishing expeditions, nor
only be made after final may they select targets
action; no meaningful
of investigation out of
judicial premalice or an intent to
determination.
harass.”180
174

Harriman v. ICC, 211 U.S. 407 (1908); FTC v. Am. Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298 (1924);
Brown v. United States, 276 U.S. 134 (1928); Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1 (1936).
175
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974).
176
U.S. v. R. Enterprises, Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 301 (1991).
177
Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362 (1956).
178
FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c)(2).
179
Id.
180
United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 299 (1991).
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We shift to administrative search warrants, which are less difficult to challenge than an
administrative subpoena. A warrant is generally required before an agency may conduct a
“search” within the Fourth Amendment.181 The Supreme Court has recognized exceptions for a
motley assortment of certain regulated industries: those involving liquor, 182 firearms,183
mining,184 or junkyards185—but not hotel operation186 or commercial activity generally.187
To validly execute an administrative warrant, an agency must provide a court with
discrete evidence of an existing violation,188 or a “reasonable belief” or “reasonable
suspicion.”189 The search must be part of a general neutral administrative plan. 190 An agency
may not conduct an investigation outside the scope of its authority, although probable cause in
the criminal sense is not required. 191
We reiterate that the landscape is different in the criminal context (although that lies
beyond the scope of this Article). Also, “evidence implicating diminished privacy interests or
for a corporation’s own books” might not be protected by the Fourth Amendment. 192
Another amendment of the Bill of Rights that protects subjects of agency investigations is
the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause. Regarding revealing document contents, this
Clause protects the respondent only from compelled self-incrimination.193 This hinges on how
the documents were originally prepared; if the responding party prepared business records
voluntarily, even if before the investigation, then the compulsion is constitutional. 194
Under the same reasoning, regarding the act of document production, the SelfIncrimination Clause may be invoked only when the subpoena or warrant “compels the holder of
the document to perform an act that may have testimonial aspects and an incriminating effect.” 195
Those aspects may be present, for example, if “[c]ompliance with the subpoena tacitly concedes

181

Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 325 & n.23 (1978).
Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
183
United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
184
Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981).
185
New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
186
City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 576 U.S. 409, 424–25 (2015).
187
See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
188
Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320–21 (1978).
189
Matter of Midwest Instruments Co., 900 F.2d 1150, 1153 (7th Cir. 1990).
190
Marshall, 436 U.S. at 320–21.
191
Id. at 320
192
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2221 & n.5 (2018) (citing cases including Untied
States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 634, 651–53 (1950); Okla. Press Pub’g Co. v. Walling,
327 U.S. 186, 189, 204–08 (1946)).
193
United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 610 (1984).
194
Id.
195
Id. at 612–13.
182
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the existence of the papers demanded.” 196 But where a respondent is required to comply with a
regulatory regime unrelated to criminal law enforcement—as is often the case with regulated
industries—there is no Self-Incrimination Clause privilege available. 197
Moreover, the Self-Incrimination Clause is inapplicable with regard to third-party
subpoenas.198 The Self-Incrimination Clause may, however, be invoked in an agency
investigation to protect against a disclosure that the respondent reasonably believes could be
used against it in a criminal proceeding or could lead to other such evidence. 199
The Supreme Court interprets the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause to provide
even less protection against improper agency investigations.200 Writing for the Court in 1960,
Chief Justice Warren acknowledged that due process “is an elusive concept,” but that “when
governmental action does not partake of an adjudication, as for example, when a general factfinding investigation is being conducted, it is not necessary that the full panoply of judicial
procedures be used.”201 The Due Process Clause tolerates an agency using its subpoena power to
gather evidence adverse to a person under investigation without notifying him or her, as “an
administrative investigation adjudicates no legal rights.” 202 Similarly, the right of crossexamination generally does not apply in agency investigations. 203
The Due Process Clause will also permit an agency working on an initially civil
investigation that results only in a criminal prosecution. 204 As the Supreme Court has held,
“[t]he discovery of evidence of crimes in the course of an otherwise proper administrative
196

Id. at 613 (quoting United States v. Fisher, 425 U.S. 391, 410 (1976)); United States v.
Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 43–45 (2000); see also In re Twelve Grand Jury Subpoenas, 908 F.3d 525,
528 (9th Cir. 2018).
197
Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1948) (introducing the required records doctrine
that is an exception to the Fifth Amendment); Balt. City Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Bouknight, 493
U.S. 549, 555–60 (1990).
198
U.S. CONST. amend. V; SEC v. Jerry T. O’Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 742 (1984) (“The
rationale of this doctrine is that the Constitution proscribes only compelled self-incrimination,
and, whatever may be the pressures exerted upon the person to whom a subpoena is directed, the
subpoena surely does not ‘compel’ anyone else to be a witness against himself.”) (internal
citations omitted).
199
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444–45 (1972).
200
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
201
Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960).
202
Jerry T. O’Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. at 742 (internal citations omitted).
203
Hannah, 363 U.S. at 445–46.
204
Doe v. United States, 253 F.3d 256, 265 (6th Cir. 2001) (“Both the Supreme Court and this
circuit have long applied [the reasonableness] test when reviewing administrative subpoena
requests, and we see no convincing basis upon which to distinguish these binding precedents
simply because this subpoena was issued pursuant to a criminal, as oppose to civil,
investigation.”); Becker v. Kroll, 494 F.3d 904, 917 (10th Cir. 2007) (noting that the
administrative subpoena was enforceable, even though it had “potential criminal ramifications,”
because it was “issued in good faith and prior to a recommendation for criminal prosecution”).
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inspection does not render that search illegal or the administrative scheme suspect.” 205 There is
thus a very low barrier to a law enforcement agency referring a matter to an administrative
agency. Parallel investigations do not violate civil liberties so long as the agency is not
investigating solely to obtain evidence for a criminal prosecution, and did not fail to advise the
defendant that a criminal prosecution has been contemplated, and there are no “other special
circumstances.”206 Stated differently, courts have approved administrative proceedings that
result from a criminal referral, so long as the criminal investigation did not interfere with the
agency’s operations, and the parallel proceedings are conducted in “good faith.” 207 The reason:
to hold otherwise, if “investigators suspected that a particular store might contain evidence of
other crimes, the investigators would be precluded from performing any administrative
inspection of that store.”208 This nevertheless leaves open an obvious potential for abuse. 209
There are some boundaries in place to prevent agency officials who cannot meet the
higher standard from doing this with the hope or intent of transitioning to criminal liability. An
agency cannot conduct an investigation when its true purpose is a criminal investigation, 210 that
is, an investigation that is not “for a purely administrative purpose,” but rather one that “carries
the real threat of criminal sanctions.”211 Courts have been mollified by the fact that “while
information obtained by an administrative subpoena could be shared with prosecutors and used
in a criminal investigation, grand jury secrecy would prevent information from moving in the
other direction.”212 That said, other courts have suggested that an administrative warrant may be
taken when the agency’s aim is not solely to build a criminal case. 213 Because the Supreme
Court—as with most facets of investigative acts—has not addressed this question in decades, a
contemporary challenge that raises these issues could result in a different outcome.
As the preceding discussion illustrates, there are many limitations in using the U.S.
Constitution to deter an agency from using an improper investigatory tool or to challenge the use
of such a tool. Even if a regulated entity could try to make out a Bivens214 claim on the above,
damages are the only remedy though they are based on a predicate finding of unconstitutional
conduct. It would not seem that a court could halt an investigation., but at least one court has
commented that it was unaware of case law permitting a Bivens remedy in the context of an
agency investigation.215
205

New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 716 (1987).
United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1970).
207
Shiv Narayan Persaud, Parallel Investigations Between Administrative and Law Enforcement
Agencies: A Question of Civil Liberties, 39 U. DAYTON L. REV. 77, 89–90 (2013).
208
United States v. Mansour, 252 F. Supp. 3d 182, 202 (W.D.N.Y. 2017).
209
Persaud, supra note 207, at 95–99 (citing possible examples).
210
Id. at 716 n.27.
211
Jacob v. Twp. of Bloomfield, 531 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 2008); United States v. Theodore, 479
F.2d 749, 753 (4th Cir. 1973).
212
Berkower, supra note 90, at 2264; see FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e).
213
See, e.g., United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1970).
214
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
215
Casella v. United States, 642 F. App’x 54, 56 (2d Cir. 2016).
206
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Putting aside whether a position is likely to succeed in the long run, the case law
generally does not permit a respondent to raise any merits defenses in challenging an agency
action. Finally, there is a lack of post-enforcement accountability. A motion to quash an
administrative warrant may be moot where the warrant has been fully executed prior to the
appeal.216 The respondent would have to argue, for example, that the issue is evading review yet
capable of repetition. Unless the party is frequently investigated by the same agency, this
showing may be difficult.
ii. Constitutional Separation of Powers
The Constitution can constrain overzealous agency investigations through not just the
Bill of Rights, but also its structure-of-government provisions. As Professor Nicholas Bagley
has written, “Congress and the president both remain on the scene, fully capable of reforming or
restraining agencies.”217 Through Article I, Congress may exercise control over certain agency
investigations—beyond, of course, legislating directly on the matter. 218
Article I is the font from which the Supreme Court infers the Non-Delegation Doctrine. 219
Some scholars hold the view that the administrative agencies have become microcosms of
government unto themselves, with Article III judicial review constrained by the APA to final
agency action.220 If challengers can reinvigorate the long-dormant non-delegation doctrine, then
they may be able to challenge agency investigatory methods on the basis that Congress did not
intend to delegate such broad authority to the agency—depending, of course, on the exact
agency, organic statute, and investigatory method used. 221
Another way Congress can restrain agency investigative acts is through its oversight
power.
Naturally, members of Congress disagree over how they want the government and its
agencies to run.223 Nevertheless, “[l]egislators tend to prioritize the investigation and monitoring
of executive bureaucracies,” because it helps them achieve policy goals and “lets them claim
222

216

Koppers Indus., Inc. v. EPA, 902 F.2d 756, 758 (9th Cir. 1990) (CERCLA warrant).
Nicholas Bagley, The Procedure Fetish, 118 MICH. L. REV. 345, 351 (2019).
218
See, e.g., SEC v. Jerry T. O’Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 745–46 (1984).
219
See, e.g., HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra note 19, § 8.1 (citing FTC v. Balt. Grain Co., 284 F. 886,
888, 890 (D. Md. 1922) (overbroad delegation would be “beyond any power which Congress can
confer”), aff’d, 267 U.S. 586 (1924)); Ronald A. Cass, Delegation Reconsidered: A Delegation
Doctrine for the Modern Administrative State, 40 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 147, 178 (2017);
Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 335–53 (2002).
220
Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231 (1994).
221
See Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2131 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“The
Constitution promises that only the people’s elected representatives may adopt new federal laws
restricting liberty.”); see id. at 2130–31 (Alito, J., concurring); Paul v. United States, 140 S. Ct.
342, 342 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., respecting the denial of certiorari).
222
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; see Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957); J.R. DeShazo
& Jody Freeman, The Congressional Competition to Control Delegated Power, 81 TEX. L. REV.
1443, 1459–66 (2003)
223
Cuéllar, supra note 79, at 274–75.
217
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credit for making the government work more efficiently and effectively.” 224 Oversight can be
“police patrol oversight”—more routinized oversight characterized by constant vigilance of what
an agency is doing—versus “fire alarm oversight”, in which Congress waits for interest groups,
the public, the media, or inspectors general to draw Congress’s attention to an agency
problem.225
Oversight may occur formally, by committees holding oversight hearings. For example,
the House held a hearing on the Federal Trade Commission’s investigation authority: “The
Federal Trade Commission and Its Section 5 Authority: Prosecutor, Judge, and Jury.” 226
Oversight can proceed less formally than committee and subcommittee hearings. Congressional
staff can examine agency investigative practices by asking questions of the agency directly and
requesting documents.227 Members can directly contact the White House for help influencing
how an agency investigates.228 Congress can use its appropriations power to fund or defund the
agency as a whole or parts of the agency to control how the agency conducts investigations. 229
Scholars have questioned whether congressional oversight is actually effective. 230 Conversely,
agencies may internalize congressional oversight signaling as a mechanism to mitigate the
adverse attention that flows from acting in defiance to congressional concerns. 231
Congress may also, of course, enact statutes channeling or directing agency investigation
processes. Reporting statutes are one example. The Government Performance and Results Act
of 1993232 requires federal agencies to develop long-term strategic plans to clarify their missions,
develop short-term performance plans to identify performance measures for outputs and
outcomes, and report to Congress how they performed against those goals. 233
Another Article I check on agency investigations is the strategic use of the Senate’s
confirmation powers. Officers of the United States must be appointed in accordance with Article

224

Id. at 296–97.
Id. at 297 (citing Mathew McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight
Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 166–68 (1984)).
226
See Opening Statement, Rep. Elijah E. Cummings, Ranking Member, House Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform (July 24, 2014),
https://oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/migrated/uploads/EEC.Ope
ningStatement.072414.pdf.
227
Cuéllar, supra note 79, at 297 (citing JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY 235–44 (1989)).
228
Id.
229
Id.; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
230
See, e.g., Philip J. Weiser, Entrepreneurial Administration, 97 B.U. L. REV. 2011, 2081
(2017).
231
Id. at 2045; Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2123 (2019).
232
Pub. L. No. 103-62, 107 Stat. 283 (codified in scattered sections of titles 5, 31, and 39 of the
U.S. Code).
233
Matthew S. Schoen, Good Enough for Government Work?: The Government Performance
Results Act of 1993 and Its Impact on Federal Agencies, 32 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 455, 456–57
(2008).
225
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II.234 The Constitution thus permits Congress to freeze the consideration of nominees or reject
them outright in response to agency investigations or information sharing—even indirect to the
nominee or the nomination itself—that proceed contrary to Congress’s wishes. 235
B. Statutory Constraints
i. Administrative Procedure Act
The Constitution provides the minimum procedural and substantive rights against agency
investigative acts. With the APA’s prescriptive positive procedures for agency adjudication and
rulemaking and its waiver of sovereign immunity to facilitate judicial review, one might assume
that the statute similarly confers positive procedures for agency investigations and procedural
protections to individuals who are the subject of investigative acts. As demonstrated in the chart
and analysis below, the APA imposed no meaningful constraints on administrative investigation.

Administrative Procedure Act Explicit Treatment of Agency
Investigative Acts
APA Section
Effect
5 U.S.C. § 555(c)
Standard for administrative subpoenas:
must be enforced “as provided for by
law”
5 U.S.C. § 555(d)
Procedural basis to challenge
administrative subpoenas and “similar
process or demand”
5 U.S.C. § 554(d)
Miscellaneous provisions, including the
limited constraints on administrative
law judges reporting to agency
investigators
The drafting history of the APA evinces little consideration of investigative acts. 236 The
Supreme Court held that APA procedures available for adjudications and rulemakings do not

234

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
See, e.g., Burgess Everett & Marianne Levine, The Senate’s Record-Breaking Gridlock under
Trump, POLITICO (June 8, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/06/08/senate-recordbreaking-gridlocktrump-303811?nname=playbook&nid=0000014f-1646-d88f-a1cf5f46b7bd0000&nrid=00000167-e00b-dea6-a1ff-eabfdb380000&nlid=630318.
236
ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, supra note 111,
at 66–69, 131–32. The Supreme Court has deferred to the Attorney General’s Manual on the
APA to the extent it does not conflict with the APA. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441
U.S. 281, 302 n.31 (1979).
235
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apply to agency investigations.237 Indeed, one of the few APA provisions concerning
investigative acts arise in a section entitled “Ancillary matters.” 238
The APA contains investigation-specific provisions, although they have not been
vigorously invoked by litigants or applied by courts. 239 In 5 U.S.C. § 554(d), the APA
acknowledges agency civil investigations by stating that an employee who participated in the
investigation may not make a formal adjudication of the resulting matter. 240 Under Section
§ 555(d), affected parties and agencies may go to court to contest or enforce, respectively,
“subp[o]ena[s] or similar process or demand.” 241 These provisions were intended to leave
unchanged the existing (i.e., pre-1946) law on judicial review of subpoenas. 242
This part of the APA is unclear and rarely litigated—especially so in the past few
decades.243 When an affected party challenges a subpoena or similar process, the few courts to
consider this provision have held that the agency bears the burden to show that the subpoena is
for a lawful purpose.244
The APA includes a substantive standard for a litigant to reference when invoking the
cause of action available under § 555(d). Under 5 U.S.C. § 555(c), any investigative act—
including subpoenas, process, inspection, and so forth—must be made and enforced “as
authorized by law.”245 This provision appears separate from the familiar APA cause of action in
5 U.S.C. § 706(2), which provides for the setting aside of final agency action that is contrary to
law or is “arbitrary or capricious.” As with the procedural § 555(d), litigants rarely invoke

237

Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 452–53 (1960).
5 U.S.C. § 555.
239
We note that our definition of an “investigative act” excludes an agency proceeding governed
by positive APA procedures. We do not consider these Sections 555(c) and (d) to be such
procedures. Otherwise, because those sections do relate to investigative acts, counting them as
positive APA procedures would have the exclusion swallow the rule and exclude everything we
have yet deemed to be an agency investigation.
240
5 U.S.C. § 554(d).
241
Id. § 555(d).
242
ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, supra note 111,
at 68–69, 131–32.
243
As of July 6, 2020, Westlaw recorded only 1,266 case citations to the entirety of 5 U.S.C.
§ 555. The database shows that of those, there are only 37 cases that use the term “555(c)” or
“6(b)” (which is the section of the APA codified at 5 U.S.C. § 555(c)). Westlaw also shows that
of those 1,266 cases, there are only 39 cases that use the term “555(d)” or “6(c)” (which is the
section of the APA codified at 5 U.S.C. § 555(d)). These meager figures are overinclusive, as
some of these cases cite to provisions within sections 555(c) and (d) that do not relate to
investigative acts, or cite to completely distinct uses of those sections.
244
United States v. Sec. State Bank & Trust, 473 F.2d 638, 642 (5th Cir. 1973) (citing “the
acceptable practice under analogous administrative schemes”).
245
5 U.S.C. § 555(c).
238
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§ 555(c) to challenge agency investigations. Both have been used sparingly. 246 This may be
consistent with the APA drafters’ expectation that this standard was a mere “restatement of
existing law.”247 Interestingly, the House Judiciary Committee Report broadly declared that the
provision codified at § 555(c) was “designed to preclude ‘fishing expedition’ and investigations
beyond the jurisdiction or authority of an agency.”248 However, the enacted provision—barring
investigative process “except as authorized by law”—is textually weaker than the Committee
Report’s remark suggests.
Nevertheless, § 555(c) may be significant because it is not coextensive with § 706(2), a
distinct solution for challenging investigative behavior. Section 706(2) is subject to the
requirement that the challenged agency conduct be “final,” 249 whereas the provision for judicial
review of agency investigative tools appears to be unencumbered by that qualification. 250
Another constraint applicable to adjudication and rulemaking, § 553, does not to apply to
§ 555(d) actions because an investigation does not appear to be an adjudication or rulemaking
under the APA’s definition of those terms. 251
There are several arguments to be made for applying these APA provisions to more
robustly police investigative acts. The APA House Judiciary Committee Report went further
than what the sparse § 555(c) and (d) case law holds. The Committee claimed that by restricting
investigative acts to those “authorized by law,” the APA authorized quashing investigative acts
that “disturb or disrupt personal privacy, or unreasonably interfere with private occupation or
enterprise.”252 The Report also warned agencies that their investigations “should be conducted
so as to interfere in the least degree compatible with adequate law enforcement.” 253
However, the enacted bill does not textually incorporate these principles, and these
guideposts were not repeated in the influential Attorney General’s Manual.254 They have been
246

See, e.g., Sch. Bd. of Broward Cnty. v. Dep’t of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 525 F.2d 900, 906
n.6 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 646 (1950) (implying a
§ 555(c) violation is judicially enforceable); J.H. Kent v. Hardin, 425 F.2d 1346, 1350 (5th Cir.
1970) (same); In re FTC Corp. Patterns Report Litig., No. 76-0126, 1977 WL 1438, at *2
(D.D.C. July 11, 1977) (same).
247
ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, supra note 111,
at 66; see also ASIMOW, supra note 8, at 47 (“The provision seems to add nothing to existing
law.”).
248
H. Rep. 1980 at 264 (May 3, 1946). One court has held that the APA does not prohibit
“fishing expeditions” in and of themselves, but rather ultra vires “fishing expeditions.” Pac.
Westbound Conference v. United States, 332 F.2d 49, 53 (9th Cir. 1964).
249
5 U.S.C. § 704.
250
See id. § 555(c), (d) (not referring to judicial review “agency action,” which § 704 generally
requires to be final).
251
Id. § 551; Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 452–53 (1960).
252
H. Rep. 1980 at 264 (May 3, 1946).
253
Id.
254
ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, supra note 111,
at 66.
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cited precisely once by a federal court—in 1964. 255 Further, under pre-APA case law that the
Attorney General’s Manual concluded was left intact by the APA, until final agency action
occurs to a respondent’s detriment, a court cannot determine whether the respondent is actually
subject to the law the agency is purporting to enforce. 256 Also, the § 555(d) standard, that an
agency investigation is “authorized by law,” is per one court merely coextensive with the
§ 706(2)(A) “arbitrary or capricious” standard. 257
There is also uncertainly as to what “law” an agency subpoena or warrant could be
quashed for violating. The Attorney General’s Manual states, “‘Law’ refers to the statutes which
a particular agency administers, together with relevant judicial decisions.” 258 At the very least,
“law” should include the Constitution. Most strictly to the affected party, some courts hold that
only the organic statute can be the authorizing “law.” 259 Some courts hold only federal law is the
authorizing “law,” not state law.260 And most strictly to the agency, some courts hold that even
the agency’s regulations can be the authorizing “law.” 261 Depending on the meaning of “law,”
the standards to which an agency subpoena or warrant could be held might be higher than the
mere constitutional minimums discussed later.
That is the extent of APA review for a party aggrieved by an agency investigation.
Standard § 706 review does not apply to investigative acts because that provision requires “final
agency action,” which agency investigations are definitionally not. 262 The Supreme Court has
held that an agency’s initiation of an investigation is not final agency action, 263 which would
reason to include antecedent investigatory acts—a decision that perhaps should have come out
differently if decided today, given more recent Court cases and the analysis in this Article.
Keying off that case, lower courts have held that certain investigation-related acts do not
255

Pac. Westbound Conference v. United States, 332 F.2d 49, 53 n.10 (9th Cir. 1964).
ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, supra note 111,
at 69 (citing Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501 (1943); Okla. Press Pub’g Co. v.
Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946); “Nothing the language of section 6(c) suggests any purpose to
change this established rule.”). See also City of Arlington v. FCC, 568 U.S. 290 (2013)
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
257
In re FTC Corp. Patterns Report Litig., No. 76-0126, 1977 WL 1438, at *2 (D.D.C. July 11,
1977) (citing United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950) and noting that that case was
reviewed under § 555 alone and not § 706).
258
ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, supra note 111,
at 69.
259
Belle Fourche Pipeline Co. v. United States, 554 F. Supp. 1350, 1358 (D. Wyo. 1983); see
United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 646 (1950); see also Appeal of FTC Line of
Bus. Report Litig., 595 F.2d 685 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (the “law” referred to is at least
the agency’s organic statute).
260
J.H. Kent v. Hardin, 425 F.2d 1346, 1350 (5th Cir. 1970).
261
Id.
262
See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(13), 704.
263
FTC v. Std. Oil Co., 449 U.S. 232, 239–45 (1980); Veldhoen v. U.S. Coast Guard, 35 F.3d
222, 225 (5th Cir. 1994) (“An agency’s initiation of an investigation does not constitute final
agency action.”).
256
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constitute final agency action,264 including informational reports after investigation 265 or certain
decisions not to investigate.266
That is not to say that no agency act associated with an investigation can be a final
agency action. Some courts in recent years have subverted the notion that such a bright line
exists. In 2016, the Supreme Court in U.S. Army Corps of Engineers v. Hawkes Co. held that an
approved jurisdictional determination by the Corps is final agency action; the affected parties
had successfully argued that the determination imposed practical burdens on them and so met the
test of finality.267 Agency investigatory tools could constitute final agency action if the
investigation is not ad hoc, but rather the agency has developed a program, policy, or practice of
investigations that crosses the line into full rule territory. 268
Agency investigative acts are also arguably prosecutorial decisions (at least where the
organic statute does not require the commencement of an investigation because of a specific
trigger).269 This renders them presumptively unreviewable under Heckler v. Chaney or subject to
the APA’s discretionary fiat270 via the organic statute. The Constitution’s respect for horizontal
separation of powers also compels that result. 271 Thus, courts generally should generally refrain
from inserting themselves into decisions of how agencies should use their resources. 272
But for immunity to be granted based on prosecutorial discretion, the statute must truly
give the agency discretion to investigate or not investigate. The D.C. Circuit recently found
justiciable the Food and Drug Administration’s decision to decline to initiate certain enforcement

264

E.g., Reliable Automatic Sprinkler Co. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n, 324 F.3d 726, 731
(D.C. Cir. 2003); Martin v. Naval Criminal Investigative Serv., 539 F. App’x 830, 832 (9th Cir.
2013); Mobil Exploration & Producing U.S., Inc. v. Dep’t of the Interior, 180 F.3d 1192, 1198–
99 (10th Cir. 1999).
265
Parsons v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 878 F.3d 162, 169 (6th Cir. 2017); Joshi v. Nat’l Transp.
Safety Bd., 791 F.3d 8, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2015); cf. United States v. L.A. & Salt Lake R.R. Co., 273
U.S. 299, 309–10 (1927).
266
Jallali v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 437 F. App’x 862, 865 (11th Cir. 2011).
267
U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co., 136 S. Ct. 1807 (2016); see also Rhea Lana, Inc.
v. Dep’t of Labor, 824 F.3d 1023 (D.C. Cir. 2016); CSI Aviation Servs., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of
Transp., 637 F.3d 408, 412–13 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
268
U.S. Dep’t of Labor v. Kast Metals Corp., 744 F.2d 1147, 1150 (5th Cir. 1984).
269
Gifford-Hill & Co. v. FTC, 523 F.2d 730, 733 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (dicta); In re FTC Corp.
Patterns Report Litig., No. 76-0126, 1977 WL 1438, at *3 (D.D.C. July 11, 1977).
270
5 U.S.C. § 701. This is to the extent that investigative acts are not reviewable under, for
example, 5 U.S.C. § 555(d).
271
See, e.g., Memorandum from Patrick Philbin, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal
Counsel, to Daniel J. Bryant, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legislative Affairs (Apr. 8, 2002);
Peter L. Markowitz, Prosecutorial Discretion Power at Its Zenith: The Power to Protect Liberty,
97 B.U. L. REV. 489, 541 n.280 (2017).
272
Ronald M. Levin, Understanding Unreviewability in Administrative Law, 74 MINN. L. REV.
689, 716 (1990).
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actions after the court interpreted a statute to entirely deprive the FDA of discretion to decline. 273
The upshot is that Congress may, sometimes, directly cabin executive prosecutorial discretion,
and by extension investigation discretion. 274
Whether an agency investigation can be challenged under 5 U.S.C. § 555(d) or § 706,
parties have no ability to raise substantive defenses during the agency investigation that will bear
on their enforcement proceeding: e.g., claims of collateral estoppel, 275 allegations that the act
upon which the investigation is based do not apply to respondents or that the respondents are not
within the agency’s jurisdiction.276 As it stands, this raises a separation of powers consideration,
as Chief Justice Roberts noted in his City of Arlington v. FCC dissent.277
One benefit the APA does provide challengers is their ability to be represented by
counsel at a hearing or interview. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel “does not attach until
after the agency has moved beyond the investigative stage,” 278 but the APA permits a party
compelled to appear before an agency to be accompanied, represented, and advised by an
attorney.279
As an additional minor point, one of the APA’s other few references to investigative
action is its prohibition on administrative law judges being supervised by employees who
investigate on behalf of the agency.280 Similarly, an investigating employee generally may not
be involved in the decision except as witness or counsel. 281 A violation of these structural
limitations would presumably give rise to a challenge that the agency action rendered was

273

Cook v. FDA, 733 F.3d 1, 7–10 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. FEC, 892 F.3d 434, 441 (D.C. Cir. 2018);
see also Greer v. Chao, 492 F.3d 962, 965 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Giacobbi v. Biermann, 780 F.
Supp. 33 (D.D.C. 1992)).
275
FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d 862, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (en banc).
276
FTC v. Ken Roberts Co., 276 F.3d 538, 584 (D.C. Cir. 2001); FMC v. Port of Seattle, 521
F.2d 431 (9th Cir. 1975); SEC v. Savage, 513 F.2d 188 (7th Cir. 1975).
277
568 U.S. 290, 327 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“[T]here is another concern at play, no
less firmly rooted in our constitutional structure. That is the obligation of the Judiciary not only
to confine itself to its proper role, but to ensure that the other branches do so as well.”).
278
Ronald F. Wright, Organization of Adjudicative Offices in Executive Departments and
Agencies, ACUS, 542 (1993), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1993Statement%2316%20Organization%20of%20Adjudicative%20Offices%20in%20Executive%20
Departments%20and%20Agencies.pdf; cf. Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25 (1976) (Sixth
Amendment right to counsel is limited to criminal proceedings).
279
5 U.S.C. § 555(b).
280
5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(2).
281
Id. § 554(d).
274
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unlawful for failing to observe required procedures. 282 However, non-administrative law judges
are not subject to these requirements.283
ii. Non-APA Statutory Constraints
Some agencies’ organic statutes erect additional constraints, both in terms of substantive
controls or independent oversight.284 Under the Inspector General Act of 1978, inspectors
general conduct and supervise audits and investigations relating to the programs and operations”
of the executive departments.285 The Inspector General Act requires the agency to give its
inspector general “timely access to all records, reports, audits, reviews, documents, papers,
recommendations, or other materials available to the” agency and which “relate to” the inspector
general’s responsibilities.286 The inspector general may also issue subpoenas, except to federal
agencies.287 An inspector general may issue subpoenas to non-federal agencies and take
testimony of “any person.”288
These provisions have caused friction between the inspectors general and the heads of
executive agencies, particularly the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Some agency heads have
contended that they alone hold the authority to release documents, and even if they do not, the
agency head determines which documents are “relate[d]” to the programs and operations under
review.289 Inspectors general have argued to the contrary, in favor of permitting access to
agency records so that the agency cannot stonewall the inspector general. 290
The Freedom of Information Act provides another bulwark. Under an earlier version of
FOIA and case law from the 1970s, investigatory files remain exempt from public disclosure

282

Id. § 706(2)(D).
Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 311 (1955) (rejecting this challenge brought under the Due
Process Clause).
284
E.g., Letter from Fed. Trade Comm’n Inspector General Roslyn A. Mazer to House
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (Sept. 30, 2015),
https://causeofaction.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/ORIGINAL-Signed-OIG-Letter-toHOGR-staff-9-30-2015.pdf.
285
5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1, 2, et seq. Some agencies have their inspector general authorized under
other authorities. See generally CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, STATUTORY INSPECTORS
GENERAL IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: A PRIMER app. B (Jan. 3, 2019),
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45450/4.
286
Id. § 6(a)(1).
287
Id. § 6(a)(4).
288
Id. § 6(a)(5).
289
Office of the Inspector General, Statement of Michael E. Horowitz Inspector General, U.S.
Department of Justice before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform concerning “Obstructing Oversight: Concerns from Inspectors General”,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE: OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. (Sept. 10, 2014),
https://oig.justice.gov/testimony/t140909.pdf.
290
Id.
283
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even after agency proceedings terminated.291 But now, an agency must produce a requested
record unless its disclosure meets one of six conditions, such as that it “could reasonably be
expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings” or could disclose law enforcement
techniques.292
Under that broad rubric, regulated entities can use FOIA to request information on
investigations.293 For example, ProPublica has used FOIA to research the Department of Health
and Human Services and the investigation close out letters it sent to healthcare providers. 294
Related to FOIA, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission releases a full set of materials
contained in a charge file at the conclusion of its investigation, although apparently only to the
person who filed the charge under its own statute. 295 The FOIA constraint is of limited efficacy.
Courts tend to defer to agencies in their assertions of exemptions. 296 Agencies are
disincentivized from complying with the requests. 297 FOIA responses are also only as good as
the information that the agency collects, which can be limited. 298
Another statute that provides protections is the Privacy Act of 1974. The Act is useful
not because it substantively limits how an agency undertakes its investigative acts, but because it
limits the fruits of those acts—thereby serving as a backend check. This Act prohibits federal
agencies from “disclos[ing] any record which is contained in a system of records by any means”
to another agency unless the individual whose information is in the record consents, or if the
disclosure would be for a “routine use” or for a “civil or criminal law enforcement activity”
provided a certain written request is made.299 A “routine use” is defined as “the use of such
record for a purpose which is compatible with the purpose for which it was collected[.]” 300 The
“law enforcement activity” exception is broader than criminal investigations, and does not
require an active investigation or a “current law enforcement necessity.” 301 The agency faces
penalties for violations. For example, if an agency releases records to another agency without an
exception to the Privacy Act, liability can lie against the government under the Federal Tort
Claims Act.302 Relatedly, for several agencies, the agency’s employees are subject to criminal
291

See, e.g., SEC v. Frankel, 460 F.2d 813 (2d Cir. 1973). Accord Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC,
424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
292
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7).
293
Margaret B. Kwoka, First-Person FOIA, 127 YALE L.J. 2204 (2018).
294
Id. at 2212 (citing Charles Ornstein, The Secret Documents that Detail How Patients’ Privacy
Is Breached, PROPUBLICA (July 21, 2016), http://www.propublica.org/article/the-secretdocuments-that-detail-how-patients-privacy-is-breached).
295
Id. at 2238.
296
Aram A. Gavoor & Daniel Miktus, Oversight of Oversight: A Proposal for More Effective
FOIA Reform, 66 CATH. U. L. REV. 525, 535–37 (2017).
297
Id. at 529–31 (describing how agencies take advantage of FOIA’s ambiguities and gaps).
298
Kwoka, supra note 293, at 2221.
299
5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(3), (7).
300
Id. § 552a(a)(4).
301
Maydak v. United States, 363 F.3d 512, 517 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
302
Doe v. DiGenova, 779 F.2d 74, 88 (D.C. Cir. 1985); see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671–2680.
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penalties (fines of up to $5,000 and imprisonment of up to a year) for disclosing any information
obtained by the agency (presumably through its investigation) without the agency’s authority. 303
Given the difficulties and challenges that an agency faces at the end of an investigative act with
collected information, the Privacy Act provides another incentive for agencies to carefully
conduct their investigations and to be careful with what they do with the information obtained
through their investigations.
C. Executive Branch Constraints
The Executive Branch can and occasionally does self-impose limiting principles to its
investigative practices. The latest iteration of this behavior—at the time of this writing—is a
2020 executive order, Executive Order 13,924, Executive Order on Regulatory Relief to Support
Economic Recovery, which enunciated ten “principles of fairness in administrative enforcement
and adjudication” that agencies should consider in revising their “procedures and practices.” 304
Most notably, Section 6(g) states that “[a]dministrative enforcement should be free of improper
Government coercion.”305 The efficacy of Presidential actions to cause behavioral change is
contingent on the will across executive branch agencies to enforce them as well as the variable
agency-specific interpretations of the meaning of “coercion” and the types of “governmental
coercion” that is “improper.”306 And, when agencies comply with executive orders, agencies’
interpretations can naturally vary.307 However, in furtherance of Section 6 of Executive Order
13,924, the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs issued an implementing memo with
over twenty unique best practices for agencies to consider and apply to their rules of procedure
and management.308 By December 2020, multiple cabinet agencies had modified their rules. 309
As with any presidential action, Executive Order 13,924 and its corresponding implementation

303

See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(i)(1).
Exec. Order No. 13,924, 85 Fed. Reg. 31353 (May 19, 2020).
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-regulatory-relief-supporteconomic-recovery/
305
Id. § 6(g).
306
Peter Raven-Hansen, Making Agencies Follow Orders: Judicial Review of Agency Violations
of Executive Order 12,291, 1983 DUKE L.J. 285, 290–91.
307
See Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 4 (1965) (counseling judicial deference to reasonable
agency interpretations of executive orders).
308
Paul J. Ray, Administrator, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, M-20-31,
Implementation of Section 6 of Executive Order 13924 (Aug. 31, 2020).
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/M-20-31.pdf.
309
See, e.g., Susan Parker Bodine, Assistant Administrator for Enforcement and Compliance
Assurance, Environmental Protection Agency, Implementation of Executive Order 13,924 (Nov.
25, 2020) https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/202011/documents/implementationofexecutiveorder13924.pdf; Steven G. Bradbury, General Counsel,
U.S. Department of Transportation, Implementation of Section 6 of Executive Order 13,924
(Nov. 13, 2020) https://www.transportation.gov/mission/enforcement/implementation-section-6executive-order-13924.
304

37

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3757677

WORKING DRAFT—JANUARY 2021

could be revoked in the discretion of the President, which underscores the limited benefit of
executive branch constraints.
IV. WHY INVESTIGATIVE ACTS SHOULD BE CHECKED
Having set out what agency investigations are and how they are permitted, we now ask:
Are investigative acts a good and useful thing, given the inadequate constraints under the law to
advance their legitimate purpose in the constitutional system? In this Part, we aim to determine
the positive and negative aspects of investigative acts. Knowing what investigative acts are
capable of, and their consequences, helps inform whether more or fewer constraints on
investigative acts are necessary.
A. The Benefits of Agency Civil Investigative Behavior
Agency investigations provide Americans with significant benefits. The Attorney
General’s Committee acknowledged this before the passage of the APA, calling it “imperative”
that a “careful investigation” take place before an agency commences formal proceedings. 310
Indeed, at least for rulemaking, the Attorney General’s Committee saw “the investigation, or
study, of the problems to be dealt with” as one of the four distinct stages in administrative
rulemaking.311 The Supreme Court, too, has noted that “it does not follow that an administrative
agency charged with seeing that the laws are enforced may not have and exercise powers of
original inquiry.”312
Agencies execute the Executive Branch’s general constitutional mandate from the
confluence of organic statutes and the Take Care clause.313 The President cannot personally see
to the creation and implementation of policy for the entire U.S. federal government, and
consequently needs a bureaucracy to carry out the functions of the President and other officers of
the United States. Agencies enforce the law and investigate numerous subjects, including
fraud,314 corruption,315 forgery,316 public health.317 Agencies strive to achieve these goals in
310

ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, supra note 47, at 62.
Id. at 102.
312
United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642 (1950).
313
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 5.
314
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., FACT SHEET,
https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/ebsa/about-ebsa/our-activities/resource-center/factsheets/ebsa-monetary-results.pdf (last visited Dec. 17, 2020) (describing how in Fiscal Year
2018, the Employee Benefits Security Administration had enforced the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act by closing 1,329 civil investigations and collecting over $807.7 million).
315
DEP’T OF STATE, FOREIGN OPERATIONS & RELATED PROGRAMS, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET
JUSTIFICATION (Mar. 11, 2019),
https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1868/FY_2020_CBJ.pdf.
316
Id.
317
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
JUSTIFICATION OF ESTIMATES FOR APPROPRIATION COMMITTEES,
311
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many situations. Evidence of a regulatory violation frequently resides solely within the hands of
the regulated entity.
Investigative action helps agencies achieve their respective statutory and executive
mandates.318 Accordingly, the Supreme Court has recognized that the constitutional basis for
agency investigative acts “would seem clearly to be comprehended in the ‘necessary and proper’
clause, as incidental to both [Congress’s] general legislative and its investigative powers.” 319 As
Professor Davis wrote the year after the enactment of the APA, “Investigations are useful for all
administrative functions, not only for rule-making, adjudication, and licensing, but also for
prosecuting, for supervising and directing, for determining general policy, for recommending
legislation, and for purposes no more specific than illuminating obscure areas to find out what if
anything should be done.”320 Professor Sunstein has argued that agencies have evolved to
become “modern America’s common law courts,” meaning they “specify abstract standards
(often involving reasonableness) and to adapt legal rules to particular contexts as facts, social
understandings of facts, and underlying values change over time.” 321 The ability to investigate
furnishes agencies with the facts to be used in such a “common law court” that are a necessary
predicate to agency action. That said, as the Supreme Court recently recognized, agencies’
decisions are “routinely informed” by considerations external to the affected parties:
considerations of politics, foreign relations, and the national security. 322 The difference in what
agencies do and what agencies regulate may lead to different uses, and abuses, of agency
investigations.323
Investigations can save resources for the agency and, collaterally, the regulated parties.
Investigative actions allow the agency to explore whether to commence an agency action without
committing to doing so and under the freedoms recognized by Heckler. An agency saves
resources by looking into an issue within the agency’s enforcement domain without fully
committing the agency to pursuing final action. 324

https://www.cdc.gov/budget/documents/fy2021/fy-2021-cdc-congressional-justification.pdf (last
visited Dec. 17, 2020).
318
HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra note 19, § 8.1; Jack W. Campbell IV, Revoking the “Fishing
License:” Recent Decisions Place Unwarranted Restrictions on Administrative Agencies’ Power
to Subpoena Personal Financial Records, 49 VAND. L. REV. 395, 396 (1996).
319
Okla. Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 214 (1946).
320
Davis, supra note 13, at 1111. The word “prosecution” in this quote seems to mean civil
prosecution, not criminal prosecution. The APA uses the same term in a civil manner as well. 5
U.S.C. § 554(d)(2).
321
Cass R. Sunstein, Is Tobacco A Drug? Administrative Agencies as Common Law Courts, 47
DUKE L.J. 1013, 1019 (1998).
322
Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2573 (2019).
323
Bagby, supra note 7, at 349 (“The courts and the Congress should reevaluate investigatory
powers if evidence mounts of abuse by either regulators or ‘targets.’”).
324
Campbell, supra note 318, at 434.
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Agency investigations can serve as a platform upon which it can bring attention to issues;
“[a]gencies may be able to solve collective action problems by . . . more readily generating
media attention.”325 So, too, can agency investigations lead Congress to legislate. 326 Agencies
have been observed to use their civil powers appropriately. 327 Due to the nebulous and largely
non-public nature of administrative investigations, the benefits that they generate evade precise
measurement: “[t]he costs and benefits of government investigations are diffuse.” 328
B. Abuses of Agency Civil Investigative Practice
There are numerous problematic aspects of how agencies are currently undertaking their
investigatory rights, obligations, and privileges. Since the twentieth century, government
agencies have been “flush with power to make highly informal decisions affecting people, where
‘the usual quality of justice’ may be quite low.” 329 This is especially problematic where those
decisions are discretionary, because agencies may find discretionary actions to be “tempting
levels to create favorable perceptions,” “as a sort of signal that the public (or political superiors)
can use in forming judgments about the competence” of the agency. 330 As the Supreme Court
admonished in a 1936 opinion from the era in which the Court viewed agency investigations
with skepticism, permitting an agency to compel individuals to produce evidence in the absence
of jurisdiction “violates the cardinal precept upon which the constitutional safeguards of personal
liberty ultimately rest,” and places the government at risk of “becom[ing] an autocracy.” 331
Agency investigations deploy immense investigatory power to target individuals and
entities with crippling and voluminous document, inspection, and interview requests. 332 The
announcement of an investigation can affect share prices as well as investor and public
confidence.333 When it was publicly revealed that the Department of Justice and the Federal
Trade Commission were launching antitrust investigations into Facebook, Amazon, and
Google’s parent company, those companies’ shares dropped 7.5%, 4.6%, and 6.1%,
respectively.334

325

Cuéllar, supra note 79, at 286.
Davis, supra note 13, at 1117.
327
See H.R. Rep. No. 1321, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 3874, 3877.
328
In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289, 312 (6th Cir.
2002) (Boggs, J., dissenting).
329
Cuéllar, supra note 79, at 279 (citing KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 216
(1969)).
330
Id. at 263.
331
Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1, 23–24 (1936).
332
Okla. Press Pub’g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 218–19 (1946) (Murphy, J., dissenting).
333
Lauren Feiner, Facebook Tumbles on Antitrust Concerns, CNBC (June 3, 2019),
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/06/03/amazon-facebook-and-google-stocks-stumble-over-antitrustconcerns.html.
334
Id.
326
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Improperly scoped agency investigations can stifle individual freedoms. Once under
investigation, an individual or entity may enter the orbit of criminal penalties in responding to
government requests for information. A misstep in the presentation of a material fact can
theoretically carry criminal consequences because making false statements in a matter within the
jurisdiction of the executive branch is a crime 335 as is corrupt interference in an official
proceeding.336 Under the FTC’s organic statute—which applies to the many other agencies for
which their respective organic statutes incorporate the FTC’s—a person who “neglect[s] or
refuse[s]” to attend, testify, answer lawful inquiries, or produce documentary evidence in
response to a federal district court order directing compliance with the agency’s order commits a
crime punishable by a fine up to $5,000, or one year of imprisonment. 337
Less directly, an agency can use a civil administrative investigation to bolster a parallel
criminal case.338 An agency can often avoid judicial review and thereby strengthen its
enforcement leverage.339 Short of criminal penalties, an agency can also take adverse action
against an employee for making false statements during an investigation of alleged misconduct
by the employee.340 Although the government may lawfully engage in “good faith” parallel civil

335

18 U.S.C. § 1001; see, e.g., United States v. Stover, 499 F. App’x 267 (4th Cir. 2012)
(affirming the conviction of a mine security director who had lied during an administrative
agency deposition he voluntarily sat for).
336
18 U.S.C. §§ 1505, 1512(c).
337
15 U.S.C. § 50 (Federal Trade Commission), incorporated by 7 U.S.C. § 1636(i)(3)
(Department of Agriculture for livestock mandatory reporting); 21 U.S.C. § 467d (Food and
Drug Administration to enforce poultry and poultry products inspection); 26 U.S.C. § 5274
(Internal Revenue Service to enforce the collection of alcohol, tobacco, and certain other excise
taxes); 27 U.S.C. § 202(g) (Department of Treasury to enforce the Federal Alcohol
Administration Act); 29 U.S.C. § 209 (Department of Labor Wage and Hour Division to enforce
the Fair Labor Standards Act). Criminal charges have been successfully brought under such
statutes. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 413 F.3d 727, 728 (8th Cir. 2005).
338
Anthony O’Rourke, Parallel Enforcement and Agency Interdependence, 77 MD. L. REV. 985,
986–87 (2018) (citing the case of SAC Capital’s Mathew Martoma, who was pursued by both the
SEC and the U.S. Attorney’s Office; “the SEC shared every document it obtained through civil
discovery from SAC Capital with prosecutors,” and “SEC attorneys and SDNY prosecutors also
jointly conducted twenty interviews of a dozen witnesses”); Berkower, supra note 90, at 2265,
2286–87 (citing the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, which “marked the first
time that Congress granted th[e] broad [administrative] investigative subpoena power solely for
criminal law enforcement purposes,” citing a delegation to the Attorney General in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3486(a)(1)(B)(i), although as of 2005 the Attorney General had delegated this power only to
AUSAs and the Criminal Division, not the Federal Bureau of Investigation, allowing them to
perform a gatekeeping function).
339
Rachel E. Barkow, Overseeing Agency Enforcement, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1129, 1137
(2016).
340
LaChance v. Erikson, 522 U.S. 262, 268 (1998).
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and criminal investigations, the standards for “good faith” are indeterminate, and even when met
the agencies may freely exchange information without prior notice to the regulated party. 341
Agency investigations can pose existential threats to the regulated entities. In addition to
the case of LabMD cited in Part I, 342 the Consumer Product Safety Commission aggressively
investigated a company that produced rare earth magnetic office-desk toys on the grounds that
they were unsafe; the agency pursued personal liability against the CEO and ultimately causing
the company to be dissolved and jobs to be lost while competitors continued to conduct business
unabated.343
Even short of existential threats, zealous investigations can unduly vex regulated parties.
The Internal Revenue Service conceded in 2013 to screening organizations’ applications for taxexempt status for politically loaded terms.344 The IRS’s exempt organizations office would
search for conservative-associated terms like “Tea Party,” “patriots,” or “9/12,” and progressiveleaning terms like “progressive,” “occupy,” and “green energy.” 345 The agency would then
subject such groups to heightened scrutiny and request additional information from them. 346
Targets of agency investigations may not have the resources to defend against
investigations or subsequent multi-year enforcement actions, and instead enter into judicially
unreviewable consent decrees. All of these consequences of unsound investigative action can be
exacerbated by “regulatory overlap.”347 A regulatory breach might carry both civil
administrative and criminal consequences and an agency might partner with the Department of
Justice to investigate.348 This could be ripe for abuse and undermine public faith in rule of law
and law enforcement. For example, there is the prospect that an administrative sanction can
serve as a pretext for a criminal investigation, theoretically allowing the agency and prosecutors
to take advantage of the lower constitutional standard for administrative subpoenas versus
criminal warrants.

341

Persaud, supra note 207, at 89–90.
See supra Part I.
343
Federal Regulators Suing Buckyballs Founder in Rare Product Recall Case, WASH. POST
(Jan. 5, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/federal_government/federal-regulatorssuing-buckyballs-founder-in-rare-product-recall-case/2014/01/05/5b8c19ec-5087-11e3-a7f0b790929232e1_story.html.
344
Justice Department Settles with Conservative Groups over IRS Scrutiny, REUTERS (Oct. 26,
2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-tax-conservative/justice-department-settles-withconservative-groups-over-irs-scrutiny-idUSKBN1CV1TY.
345
Id.; Alan Rappeport, In Targeting Political Groups, I.R.S. Crossed Party Lines, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/05/us/politics/irs-targeting-tea-party-liberalsdemocrats.html.
346
Justice Department Settles with Conservative Groups over IRS Scrutiny, supra note 356.
347
Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 HARV. L.
REV. 1131, 1138–51 (2012).
348
O’Rourke, supra note 350.
342
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Scholars have identified agency over-regulation in the setting of rulemaking (and agency
investigations preceding rulemaking).349 In the aggregate, regulatory overlap creates
redundancy, which increases the cumulative cost of agency action and thus, presumably, the
antecedent agency investigations.350 The same overlap concerns should hold true for agency
investigations preceding enforcement or adjudication. That setting faces an additional problem:
“multiple potential enforcers who undoubtedly already have jurisdiction over an issue might
have incentives to show enforcement zeal, even if duplicating others’ efforts.” 351
Conversely, regulatory overlap could actually incentivize under-regulation in the face of
regulatory overlap: the “regulatory commons” effect. 352 Under this theory, overlapping agency
jurisdiction can actually stymie agency action (and agency investigations), 353 assuming that one
agency has not naturally become the prime or traditional regulatory of an issue despite others’
potential authority.354 There may even be some advantages to regulatory overlap and
administrative crossfire, such as overcoming regulatory inertia, breaking down jurisdictional
barriers, and spurring regulatory innovation. 355 However, these doctrines should be viewed in
consideration of modern Congresses, which have been riven with legislative torpor. 356
Reputational harms may be at stake because agencies are inconsistent, sometime
internally, with how they publicly address their investigative work. 357 But some have called out,
for example, the FTC’s “practices of ‘issuing news releases and the adverse effects resulting
therefrom,” to which the D.C. Circuit and Congress “had essentially acquiesced.” 358 Often, the
349

See generally J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Mozart and the Red Queen: The Problem of
Regulatory Accretion in the Administrative State, 91 GEORGETOWN L.J. 757 (2003).
350
Robert B. Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 863, 897 (2006).
351
William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of Regulatory Gaps, 89
IOWA L. REV. 1, 29 n.81 (2003).
352
Id. at 22, 27.
353
Id.
354
Id. at 29 n.81.
355
Catherine M. Sharkey, Agency Coordination in Consumer Protection, 2013 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
329, 334 (citing Ahdieh, supra note 362, at 882–83).
356
See Drew DeSilver, A Productivity Scorecard for the 115th Congress: More Laws than
Before, But Not More Substance, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Jan. 25, 2019),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/01/25/a-productivity-scorecard-for-115thcongress/; Mark Murray, Unproductive Congress: How Stalemates Became the Norm in
Washington DC, NBC NEWS (June 30, 2013),
http://firstread.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/06/30/19206400-unproductive-congress-howstalemates-became-the-norm-in-washington-dc; Michael Ellement, The Supreme Court Meets a
Gridlocked Congress, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. ARGUENDO 116 (2016).
357
Nathan Cortez, Adverse Publicity by Administrative Agencies in the Internet Era, 2011
B.Y.U. L. REV. 1371.
358
Id. at 1386; see Commission Closing Letters, FED. TRADE COMM’N,
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/closing-letters-and-other-publicstatements/commission-closing-letters (last visited Dec. 17, 2020) (listing the FTC’s letters
announcing the close of investigations).
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reputational risk is built into the statute. If the Securities and Exchange Commission censures a
business association, that entity can face additional disclosure requirements, ineligibility to
obtain federal contracts, and the possibility of criminal proceedings, civil securities class actions,
or shareholder derivative actions.359 Additionally, when persons affiliated with the business
association (such as customers, vendors, moneylenders, shareholders, and employees) are
contacted by the SEC, rumors can take root. 360 The mere initiation of the investigation may be
as damaging as a guilty verdict. 361
Agency investigations, even when appropriate, carry significant economic costs on the
public fisc and on targets. Taxpayers bear the brunt of most agency investigative costs. 362 For
example, for Fiscal Year 2019, the Federal Trade Commission requested an increase of
$3,383,000 for “expert witness needs due to increased numbers of complex investigations and
litigation in both competition and consumer protection matters.” 363 The FTC requested a total
appropriation of $309.7 million for Fiscal Year 2019.364 Under the now-lapsed Ethics in
Government Act of 1978 and other authorities, independent counsel investigations, too, can cost
millions of dollars to the independent counsel’s office and to the target defending against the
charges.365 That said, some agencies return money to the Department of Treasury. To again use
the example of the FTC, the agency returns billions annually to Treasury. 366 These costs might
not affect or incentivize any particular agency behavior, but their costs are important to consider
in appreciating the scope of investigative acts.
Responding parties, too, can incur sizable monetary costs to respond to an
investigation367. For example, ignoring an Environmental Protection Agency information
359

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AVOIDING AND RESPONDING TO MISCONDUCT § 14.06.
Lewis B. Merrifield III, Investigations by the Securities and Exchange Commission, 32 BUS.
LAW. 1583, 1594 (1977).
361
Id. Prosecutors may consider the collateral consequences of criminally prosecuting a
corporate entity, which include “the possibly substantial consequences to a corporation’s
employees, investors, pensioners, and customers, many of whom may, depending on the size and
nature of the corporation and their role in its operations, have played no role in the criminal
conduct, have been unaware of it, or have been unable to prevent it.” DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE
MANUAL § 9-28.1100.B, https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-28000-principles-federal-prosecutionbusiness-organizations (last visited Dec. 17, 2020).
362
See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 318, at 435.
363
FED. TRADE COMM’N, FISCAL YEAR 2019 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION (Feb. 12,
2018), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/fy-2019-congressional-budgetjustification/ftc_congressional_budget_justification_fy_2019.pdf.
364
Id.
365
Hanly A. Ingram, United States v. Tucker: Should Independent Counsels Investigate and
Prosecute Ordinary Citizens?, 86 KY. L.J. 741, 768 (1997).
366
FED. TRADE COMM’N, FISCAL YEAR 2021 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION 60 (Feb.
10, 2020), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/fy-2021-congressional-budgetjustification/fy_2021_cbj_final.pdf.
367
United States v. Am. Target Advert., Inc., 257 F.3d 348, 353–54 (4th Cir. 2001) (internal
quotations omitted).
360
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request could cost up to $25,000 per day of noncompliance. 368 Not only can agencies engage in
the above practices, but they may become comfortable doing so. An agency might come into the
agency investigation with—or develop over the course of the investigation—outcomedeterminative bias or preordination. An agency has strong motives to do so in the absence of
meaningful, systemic countermeasures.
Absent an admission from an agency decisionmaker or a judicial finding, one might not
be able to conclude that a particular agency is engaging in bad practices. Agencies generally
commence rulemaking procedures with an anticipated outcome—if the agency does not think the
rule was fundamentally viable, it would not have started the rulemaking efforts. 369 What a
challenger might be able to show is that the agency is cutting corners based on precedent, past
behavior, or political expediency. 370 But it is very difficult to prove an unalterably closed
mind.371 Even when the Supreme Court held the Secretary of Commerce had improperly used
pretext to justify its asking of a new census question, it did not conclude that was foreclosed
from reconsidering.372
Another harm from improper agency investigations is more abstract: constitutional
horizontal separation of powers concerns. Many administrative agencies operate in a zone that is
free of oversight from both the policy prerogatives of the First Branch and the oversight of the
Third Branch, especially if the organic statute provides no guidelines or Article III review of
investigative practices. The result, anecdotally and systemically, is the risk of tyrannical
behavior by agencies and within them, bureaucrats who are not politically accountable as
principal or inferior officers of the United States under the Appointments Clause. 373
A key caveat must be reinforced in this assessment of the harms of overzealous agency
investigations: it is impossible to know the full extent of how agencies are investigating. To the
extent such information even could be aggregated, agencies rarely report it publicly, such that
one could readily research it. Agencies generally do not report who and how they are
investigating.374 Thus, not every agency will announce the commencement of an investigation,
368

United States v. Gurley, 384 F.3d 316, 324 (6th Cir. 2004) (validating the assessment of civil
penalties of up to $25,000 per day for noncompliance per 42 U.S.C. § 9604(e)(5)(B), and
affirming the levy of a smaller amount against a defendant, $1.9 million for seven years of
willful noncompliance).
369
See Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2573 (2019); FTC v. Cement Institute,
333 U.S. 683, 700–03 (1948).
370
United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 265–66 (1954) (holding that an
agency must follow its own regulations).
371
Air Transp. Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Nat’l Mediation Bd., 663 F.3d 476, 487-488 (D.C. Cir.
2011).
372
Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2573–76 (2019).
373
See Jennifer L. Mascott, Who Are “Officers of the United States”?, 70 STAN. L. REV. 443
(2018).
374
For instance, “[i]n general, the Department of Justice does not publicly announce
investigations or investigative findings.” U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., When Does
the Division Announce Investigations?, https://www.justice.gov/crt/when-does-division45
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detail an expansion of the investigation’s scope, or issue close-out letters. 375 Even when an
agency provides a “cold comfort letter” announcing that it harbors no present intentions to take
additional enforcement action against an entity, such letters are often not enforceable and give no
indication as to when an investigation might come back to life. 376
This potential for the above abuse is real and has been occasionally recognized since the
rise of the Administrative State. Over 70 years ago, Justice Murphy, dissenting in Oklahoma
Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, noted with trepidation the metastatic growth of the
administrative state (which has only accelerated since he wrote in 1946). 377 He implored agency
investigators to feel “a new and broader sense of responsibility,” lest they succumb to the “open
invitation to abuse” the immense power of agency investigations and repeat the missteps of the
pre-Revolution British monarchy. 378 “Only by confining the subpoena power exclusively to the
judiciary,” Justice Murphy opined, “can there be any insurance against this corrosion of
liberty.”379
The concurrences in the 1985 Heckler v. Chaney opinion expressed trepidation that the
majority opinion “empowered” agencies to administratively close investigations. Justice
Brennan, concurring, listed circumstances in which he believed that, statutory language aside,
non-enforcement decisions should be reviewable. 380 Justice Marshall’s separate concurrence
went further, arguing that district courts had invented remedies aimed at agencies to ensure
“administrative fidelity to congressional objectives.”381 In his view, the majority’s creation of a
“presumption of unreviewability” was an act of the Supreme Court failing to use “a scalpel
rather than a blunderbuss” to correct those remedies Justice Marshall posited that “[t]raditional
principles of rationality and fair process do offer ‘meaningful standards’ and ‘law to apply’ to an
announce-investigations (last updated Oct. 18, 2018). The Department of Justice justifies its
policy by citing the possibility that a premature announcement may impair the Department’s
ability to build a case, as well as the possible prejudice to the responding party. Id. However,
the Department may announce investigations when they result in enforcement action or when
law enforcement entities are involved. Id.
375
Some agencies do, after the fact, report certain statistics on investigations opened, for
example, the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST
DIV., WORKLOAD STATISTICS, https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/788426/download (last visited
Dec. 17, 2020).
376
Fresenius Medical Care v. United States, 526 F.3d 372, 374–76 (8th Cir. 2008); Jonathan
Cone et al., Negotiating False Claims Act Settlements, 14-3 BRPAPERS 1, 14-3 Briefing Papers
1, 10 (2014); see, e.g., Debtors’ Mot. For Entry of an Order Authorizing, but Not Directing, the
Debtors’ Entry into the Settlement Agreement & Approving the Settlement of the Qui Tam
Claims and Related Matters, In re Trident Holding Co., No. 19-10384 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. filed
Aug. 29, 2019), Dkt. 837.
377
Okla. Press Pub’g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 218 (1950) (Murphy, J., dissenting).
378
Id. at 218–19.
379
Id. at 219.
380
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 839 (1985) (Brennan, J. concurring) (internal citations
omitted).
381
Id. at 852 (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment only).
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agency’s decision not to act, and no presumption of unreviewability should be allowed to trump
these principles.”382
Justice Marshall’s points may gain greater force when read in light of one of the
majority’s key justifications and considering how that justification has aged. The majority
concluded that agency exercises of administrative civil prosecutorial discretion are
presumptively non-reviewable, as “[a]n agency generally cannot act against each technical
violation of the statute it is charged with enforcing.”383 As showcased above, the empirical
predicate of Heckler may be eroding, especially in light of the possibility of technologyfacilitated total enforcement. At minimum, it is a clear expression of the Court justifying its
holding based on an agency’s limited ability to enforce at high volumes, which implies a similar
limitation on its ability to investigate.
The above harms are all the more important to study considering the potential for
disruptive new technologies to increase agencies’ abilities to investigate. The deployment of
machine learning384 and other artificial intelligence-based technologies that are already pervasive
in the criminal justice system385 have begun to change the Administrative State. Researchers
recently applied machine learning to analyze existing satellite data to identify previously
unknown industrial animal farms known in North Carolina for Clean Water Act enforcement. 386
This transaction evidences how transformative, scalable, and affordable artificial intelligence can
be for administrative investigative practices. 387 By replicating and improving upon human
cognitive and personnel capability, artificial intelligence harkens the possibility of a total
enforcement environment where many more regulatory violations could be brought to account. 388

382

Id. at 854.
Id. at 831 (majority op.).
384
“Machine learning” is a type of artificial intelligence that uses algorithms to construct
computer models that analyze large data sets, typically to predict the future. See Federal Agency
Data Mining Reporting Act of 2007, 42 U.S.C. § 2000ee-3(b)(1)(A) (2012) (“The term ‘data
mining’ means a program involving pattern-based queries, searches, or other analyses of 1 or
more electronic databases . . . to discover or locate a predictive pattern or anomaly indicative of
terrorist or criminal activity . . . .”)
385
Emily Berman, A Government of Laws and Not of Machines, 98 B.U. L. REV. 1277, 1293
(2018).
386
Laura Poppick, Environment Watchdogs Harness AI to Track Overflowing Factory-Farm
Waste, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (Apr. 11, 2019),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/environment-watchdogs-harness-ai-to-trackoverflowing-factory-farm-waste/.
387
Harry Surden, Machine Learning and Law, 89 WASH. L. REV. 87, 88 (2014) (“In the last few
decades, researchers have successfully used machine learning to automate a variety of
sophisticated tasks that were previously presumed to require human cognition.”). These tasks
include language translation, vehicle driving, revealing bank fraud, calculating credit risk, and so
forth.
388
The seminal case that rendered administrative prosecutorial discretion presumptively
unreviewable was undergirded by an assumption that “agency generally cannot act against each
383
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In light of this exercise of administrative power, it is necessary to consider the limiting principles
that are in place to guide agencies in the increasing likely hypothetical scenario in which one
decides to run an inspection-enforcement program that involves mailing packages full of
machine sight-enabled drones to map, examine, and inspect a warehouse and every product
running in an assembly line, and then transmit the data on a 5G wireless network to a
government supercomputer that is running a deep learning 389 algorithm to test the possible
violation of numerous statutes and regulations.
In sum, while investigative acts are necessary to agencies fulfilling their constitutional and
statutory duties, they also open the door to unaccountable abuse.
VI.

APPLYING MEANINGFUL CONSTRAINTS TO AGENCY INVESTIGATIONS

As this Article has demonstrated, there is no currently-applied meaningful constraint to
investigative acts that violate the Constitution or statutes. Professor Davis observed 73 years ago
that “[n]arrow judicial interpretations have given rise to strikingly large grants of power.” 390 His
observation remains correct today. As applied by the courts, the APA does not provide for
meaningful or timely judicial review to challenge agency subpoenas or other process due to the
“authorized by law” substantive standard. While that phrase is textually capacious, courts have
construed it narrowly. The marginally less deferential § 706(2) judicial review provision of the
APA, which assesses whether an agency act is “arbitrary or capricious,” is hamstrung by the
requirement that the tool be “final agency action.”
Since 1950, the Supreme Court has given little effect to many of the individual liberty
provisions of the Constitution, which are incorporated by the APA’s “authorized by law”
standard. The standards that apply to agency subpoenas, warrants, or other investigative
techniques need only meet minimal thresholds such as be not “unduly burdensome,” or
“reasonably relevant.” Regulated entities should recognize and use other tools to shed light on
the murky area of agency investigations.
First, individuals and entities should make more robust use of existing judicial constraints
and push courts to expand the boundaries of judicial review. 391 This is not an easy task, given
courts’ tendencies to uphold investigative acts under the thinking that “[j]udicial supervision of
agency decisions to investigate might hopelessly entangle the courts in areas that would prove to

technical violation of the statute it is charged with enforcing.” Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821,
831 (1985).
389
Deep learning is a term for a strand of AI processes by which a computer program refines its
own internal models to improve its ability to process a set of information. LeCun, Bengio, &
Hinton, Deep Learning, 521 NATURE 436 (2015).
390
Davis, supra note 13, at 1117.
391
Rachel E. Barkow, Overseeing Agency Enforcement, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1129, 1162
(2016) (describing advantages of judicial review of agency enforcement practices).
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be unmanageable and would certainly throw great amounts of sand into the gears of the
administrative process.”392
The greatest potential source of assistance for helping guard against abusive agency
investigations may be the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court, upon being confronted with
the issue, should revisit the current state of the law by more closely reviewing agencies’
interpretations of their investigations and investigative acts. 393
To accomplish that, courts could create a better remedy for an overbroad, burdensome, or
ultra vires subpoena or warrant. The current review regime is almost unassailably deferential to
the agency, offers a remedy of simply having the agency limit the scope of the subpoena, and
makes the respondent wait until the commencement and termination of agency adjudication to be
able to challenge the agency, at which point the challenge can be practically, if not legally, moot.
Courts can simply grant declaratory relief to plaintiffs with limiting instructions. More careful
Fourth Amendment scrutiny would deter the agency from being overbroad or needlessly
intrusive from the start, especially given the disincentives responding parties face to contesting
such improper investigative acts.394 Litigants and judges should also pay very close attention to
the agencies’ enabling statutes and ensure that agency investigative powers are authorized by the
statute. More modern views of statutory interpretation techniques since Oklahoma Press
Publishing and Morton Salt could lead courts to arrive at new conclusions about what, precisely,
Congress has actually authorized an agency to do with regard to an individual or entity it is
investigating. Relatedly, a challenger might seek reexamination of a 1947 Supreme Court
decision that absent an explicit statutory prohibition, an agency head may delegate down the
chain of command to sign and issue subpoenas. 395
The Supreme Court should balance the separated powers against the odd and problematic
state of administrative law, today. These constitutional arguments are not wholly new. The
Supreme Court endorsed them in pre-World War II cases, when the Court was much more
skeptical of agency investigatory techniques. 396 A resurgence of those cases’ reasoning would
help rein in abusive investigations. One part of that resurgence could perhaps be the resurrection
of the Supreme Court’s limitation of subpoenas to where “the sacrifice of privacy is necessary—
those where the investigations concern a specific breach of the law.”397 Litigants could also
appeal to the Court’s bygone concern of roving inquiries into regulated parties’ records and
392

SEC v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 648 F.2d 118, 127 n.12 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc)
(quoting Dresser Indus., Inc. v. United States, 596 F.2d 1231, 1235 n.1 (5th Cir. 1979)).
393
Persaud, supra note 207, at 89–90.
394
See Robert L. Glicksman & Emily Hammond, The Administrative Law of Regulatory Slop
and Strategy, 68 DUKE L.J. 1651, 1686–88 (2019) (arguing for remedies to clean up “regulatory
slop,” such as fee-shifting provisions, injunctions, tailored instructions on remand, and the
contempt power).
395
Fleming v. Mohawk Wrecking & Lumber Co., 331 U.S. 111, 121–22 (1947).
396
Scherb, supra note 136, at 1079.
397
Harriman v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 211 U.S. 407, 419–20 (1908) (emphasis
added).
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conduct, which it previously deemed as “contrary to the first principles of justice.” 398 Those
barriers fell with Oklahoma Press Publishing in 1946,399 but they could be restored. Such a view
would dovetail with the recent, general judicial evolution toward closer inspection of agency
activity.400
Specifically, the Court should revisit Oklahoma Press Publishing and Morton Salt, which
discounted stare decisis to make the very deferential Fourth Amendment case law in force today.
The Court should apply a standard for quashing agency subpoenas or warrants with fidelity to
the requirement that only the organic statute provides the agency authority to perform an
investigative act. In so doing, the Court should eschew constraints such as the limitation that
investigative acts not be performed in “bad faith,” which arguably reserves discretion for judges
to be lax in policing the use of investigative acts. The Court should consider setting probable
cause as the standard for issuing an administrative warrant, especially given the potential for a
civil investigation founded on an administrative warrant to morph into a criminal
investigation.401 Courts should also prohibit administratively-obtained investigative materials
from being used against the producing party in a criminal case unless such material could have
been obtained in a criminal investigation under the Fourth Amendment.
The Fifth Amendment should be reinvigorated in this arena. Courts should recognize a
due process property and liberty interest to more-robustly challenge an administrative
investigation that is onerous and abusive. This could be a corollary to the current Fourth
Amendment defense against unduly burdensome investigations. This interest might protect, for
example, parties from having to produce privileged information to agencies. 402
This constitutional landscape will be difficult to shape. Litigants may have greater
success with the APA, though the Court has been increasingly willing to robustly review
administrative authority as of late.403 The APA’s provision for challenging agency subpoenas,
warrants, and other process, 5 U.S.C. § 555(c) and (d), is very rarely used, especially in the past
few decades. Litigants could breathe new life into these provisions and help develop case law
into its meaning. These provisions are textually not limited by the final-agency-action
requirement, and so could be used in lieu of, or in addition to, the more broadly available
provision for challenging agency action, 5 U.S.C. § 706. Of course, this provision may not be as
helpful to affected parties as they may like, though, because the Fourth Amendment already
permits respondents to challenge subpoenas and warrants on the ground that the agency lacks the
authority to issue them.

398

FTC v. Am. Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 306 (1924).
HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra note 19, at § 8.1 (5th ed. 2010).
400
See, e.g., Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2440 (2019).
401
See Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320 (1978).
402
See supra note 154.
403
Gillian Metzger, The Roberts Court and Administrative Law, 2019 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 1
(“Administrative law today is marked by the legal equivalent of mortal combat, where
foundational principles are fiercely disputed and basic doctrines are offered up for ‘execution’”).
399

50

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3757677

WORKING DRAFT—JANUARY 2021

Litigants may consider arguing for a more robust interpretation of § 555(c), which states
that investigative acts must be “authorized by law.” 404 A more respondent-friendly interpretation
of § 555(c) might accord with the APA House Judiciary Committee Report, which stated that
APA investigative acts not only had to fall within the agency’s jurisdiction, but also had to
respect, to the greatest reasonable degree, personal privacy and industry. 405 To avail itself of the
House Judiciary Committee Report language, a party does not have the benefit of case law—
which appears to have cited, but not applied, this language only once. 406 But, such party can
point to the fact that the Supreme Court has cited the House Judiciary Committee Report with
approval, if not dispositive weight. 407 This may be the only way to argue that § 555(c) is a hook
to challenge an investigation as coercive or an abusive use of prosecutorial discretion, which we
believe is a reason to curb an agency investigation.
An affected party could argue that a broad agency investigation impermissibly blurs the
separation of powers and is thus not authorized by law. A court could quash the investigatory
tool on that basis. This aligns with a recent opinion authored by a Justice in the space of nondelegation doctrine, where administrative law impacts on significant national issues tie, arguably
fatally, into broader separation of powers considerations.408
One semi-efficacious mechanism for entertaining § 555(d) challenges could be the
judicial imposition of a “clear statement” requirement as a canon of construction. That is, a
statute should have to clearly and expressly provide the agency with particular investigatory
powers—a general delegation of authority for rulemaking or adjudication would not suffice. On
the aggregate, this approach would benefit privacy and private interests as courts fail to find
investigative authority in vague or empty legislative delegations and as Congress’s likely inertia
or inaction fails to respond.
A “clear statement” requirement would shift the burden from the respondent to the
agency. This approach would be consistent with other “clear statement” canons the Court has
imposed to protect constitutional values, for example the presumption against retroactivity, 409 or
the presumption in favor of judicial review. 410 Requiring such a canon here would be compatible
with these more recent cases and present an avenue to develop the law in a way that does not

404

5 U.S.C. § 555(c).
H. Rep. 1980 at 264 (May 3, 1946).
406
See Pac. Westbound Conference v. United States, 332 F.2d 49, 53 n.10 (9th Cir. 1964).
Davis, supra note 13, at 1134; ASIMOW, supra note 8, at 47 (“[Section 555(c)] seems to add
nothing to existing law.”); see also FTC v. Am. Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. at 305–06.
407
See Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. 1668, 1680 (2019); Chrysler Corp.
v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 313 (1979); see also Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2436 (2019)
(Gorsuch, J., concurring).
408
Paul v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 342, 342 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., respecting the denial of
certiorari)
409
Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp. 488 U.S. 204 (1988).
410
Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1905–06 (2020).
405

51

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3757677

WORKING DRAFT—JANUARY 2021

squarely challenge stare decisis.411 Finally, a statement would heed the Attorney General
Committee’s warning from almost 80 years ago that the power to procure information “should
not be withheld” from administrative agencies when needed, “but it should be exercised with
restraint and with knowledge that the burden imposed is a mounting one.” 412
A court’s careful canvass of the text and legislative history of the agency’s enabling
statute would help ensure that Congress in fact intended to give the agency the power of
investigation. Affected parties should also try to make more of § 706 challenges. They could
advocate for styling an administrative investigation as adjudication (either categorically or on a
case-by-case basis). Then, certain requests, such as a massive document search, could be
classified as a final agency action, especially in the context of adverse consequences for noncompliance. The Supreme Court might also conclude that agency investigations, as we have
defined them—with the elements of coercion and affirmative steps—are APA final agency
actions.
That may be difficult in terms of the current § 704 finality case law from the Supreme
Court and circuit courts. But as noted earlier, recent Supreme Court decisions have softened
§ 704’s final action barrier as a response to this problem, including by viewing some closing
letters as final agency action.413 A closing letter is different from a decision to initiate an
investigation. As the Sixth Circuit has held, Hawkes may be distinguishable; if the agency’s
report or determination had legal consequences like prohibiting the agency from bringing
enforcement proceedings or denying the respondent legal safe harbor, then it is final agency
action. But if further decisionmaking is available, then it may not be final agency action. 414
The extra-statutory “exceptional circumstances” exception to finality might also yield
helpful new constraints on agency investigations. Specific investigatory tactics might also be
final agency action.415 Individuals should keep an eye for when investigatory patterns emerge
such that the policy or practice could itself be challenged under the APA on an as-applied basis
to the individual and for failure to comply with rulemaking strictures. For example, an AIassisted forensic review of an entire database might be such a concrete and widespread act by an
agency as to constitute a substantive rule, for which notice-and-comment rulemaking is required
and judicial review is available.416
411

This approach would also vindicate Justice Marshall’s concerns in his Heckler v. Chaney
concurrence about ensuring “administrative fidelity to congressional objectives.” Heckler v.
Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 852 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment only).
412
ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, supra note 47, at 114.
413
See, e.g., Sackett v. EPA, 566 U.S. 120 (2012) (holding that EPA compliance orders are final
agency action).
414
Parsons v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 878 F.3d 162, 170–71 (6th Cir. 2017).
415
See Veldhoen v. U.S. Coast Guard, 35 F.3d 222, 225 (5th Cir. 1994) (“Normally, the plaintiff
must await resolution of the agency’s inquiry and challenge the final agency decision.”).
416
See HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra note 19, at § 8.1 (chronicling the sometimes hazy line between
adjudications and rules, but noting that being addressed to unnamed classes of individuals not
presently before the agency is a hallmark of rules).
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Second, individuals and entities should avail themselves of the political process. An
agency investigation presumably ought to be typically centered around some discrete body of
individuals. The more individuals targeted by an agency, the more effectively those individuals
have access to political machinery to resolve an issue. The Internal Revenue Service scandal
involving the targeting of political-sounding groups seeking tax-exempt status riled enough
groups and representatives that the agency settled a lawsuit and apologized, and its commissioner
resigned. But our concern is with the absence of countermajoritarian protections, the rights of
the individual or near-individual.
Third, Congress should consider legislative fixes. We recognize the political reality that
prospective legislation of this sort presents for actual passage into law is a major challenge. The
impetus for this might be analogous to when Congress let the independent counsel statute 417
lapse. The history suggests that the law’s critics of both parties complained that the independent
counsel wasted taxpayer money while pursuing offenses short of “high crimes and
misdemeanors” and while trampling on individual rights. 418 Then-Deputy Attorney General Eric
H. Holder, Jr., appears to have testified that a continuation of the special counsel statute was
unnecessary, as the Department of Justice can investigate most crimes itself. 419 Thus, Congress
would need to free itself of this thinking if it were to consider that agencies might not, in fact, be
the best guards of their own investigatory behavior.
Specifically, Congress could go beyond the minimum requirements of Fourth
Amendment or other constitutional provisions. Congress could enshrine substantive objections
or new procedural vehicles into the APA. Although no member appears to have introduced a bill
on the subject in recent Congresses, the Administrative Conference of the United States
(“ACUS”) could be a model. In December 2016, the Adjudication Committee of ACUS
recommended new procedures for evidentiary hearings not required by the APA that are presided
over by administrative law judges.420 Of note, ACUS recommended:



Agencies should separate their internal functions. The personnel who investigate,
prosecute, and advocate should not also serve an adjudicatory function 421
Agencies should engage in discovery with rules closer to those contained in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, including an agency showing of need and cost justification. 422
(We add requiring the agencies to adhere to “proportionality,” such as used in Federal

417

28 U.S.C. §§ 591–599 (1994) (expired).
David Stout & David Johnston, Justice Officials to Call for End to Counsel Law, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 2, 1999.
419
Id.
420
ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, EVIDENTIARY HEARINGS NOT
REQUIRED BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT (Dec. 15, 2016),
https://www.acus.gov/recommendation/evidentiary-hearings-not-required-administrativeprocedure-act.
421
Id.
422
Id.
418
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Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b),423 could help properly focus their investigative acts,
particularly where the information sought may be primarily electronically stored.)
Agencies with subpoena or other process power fully detail their subpoena practice. 424
Agencies should develop rules of evidence. 425
Agency should provide written or transcribable decisions, and decisions should be made
precedential.426

ACUS’s recommendations appear to be sound, or at least are good templates for the sort
of reform that Congress should consider to increase transparency in the civil administrative
investigation process.
The First Branch could amend agencies’ organic statutes to clarify or limit their
investigatory authorities to ensure they are in compliance with congressional intent and are wellproportioned to the agency’s mission. Congress could refocus agency priorities by explicitly
separating compensation and advancement metrics from violation-centered outcomes. That is,
agency employees or the agency as a whole should not receive incentives for pursuing
investigations that result in enforcement actions. Congress should consider limiting an agency’s
ability to initiate additional investigations after commencing adjudication, to prevent the pressure
of additional investigations from coercing settlement or acquiescence.
Relatedly, the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), which provides for attorneys’ fees
to certain prevailing private parties in “civil actions” against the federal government, could be
amended.427 The APA has a similar provision for prevailing parties in adversary
adjudications.428 These provisions could explicitly apply to § 555(d) challenges of agency
investigatory tools. Congress could expand EAJA accessibility for attorney’s costs and fees
associated with pre-litigation investigations and enforcement actions. 429
Congress could also reform the oversight process; if regulated entities are not able to hold
overzealous investigating agencies accountable, then other government actors should be able to.
The Department of Justice has commended judicial review of administrative subpoenas, saying,
“judicial involvement in enforcement ensures a good degree of fairness.” 430 Funding more
inspectors general or expanding their powers might positively impact the oversight process. 431
Congress could also require agencies to report more data on investigations they have begun,
423

FED R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 4201.
425
Id.
426
Id.
427
28 U.S.C. § 2412.
428
5 U.S.C. § 504.
429
The latest edition of the EAJA model rules by ACUS, for what it is worth, do not include any
sort of expansion. See ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 431.
430
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE USE OF ADMINISTRATIVE SUBPOENA AUTHORITIES BY
EXECUTIVE BRANCH AGENCIES AND ENTITIES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY
apps. (2002), https://www.justice.gov/archive/olp/rpt_to_congress.htm#4.
431
Cuéllar, supra note 79, at 299.
424
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including the steps undertaken in pursuit of the investigation and the eventual result of the
investigation. Even if that information is not made public, simply having this information would
better enable Congress—and agency heads—to determine whether agency investigators are
acting in accordance with the Constitution, the organic statute, and principles of good
governance.
Finally, agencies themselves could self-regulate and impose durable constraints on
themselves through the rulemaking process. Regulations defining the scope of an agency’s
investigation, and creating procedural opportunities for responding parties to contest an
investigation’s scope or methods, are not unheard of. For example, the Securities and Exchange
Commission has a regulation that provides, “Persons who become involved in . . . [SEC]
investigations may . . . submit a written statement to the Commission setting forth their interests
and position in regard to the subject matter of the investigation.” 432
Of course, an agency would seem to have little incentive to voluntarily make rules
reining in its investigative authority. This is especially so given the costs to the agency of even
making the rule. However, there is historical precedent; agencies, especially before the APA
was enacted, not infrequently developed standards of conduct which they committed to follow. 433
Even if an agency does not want to self-regulate, respondents have at least two possible routes to
pressure the agency to do so. Respondents could submit comments urging the adopting of selfscoping rules when the agency is considering related rules. Respondents could also petition the
agency to make these rules under the APA’s petition procedure. 434 This would help craft new
equipment with which to detect and study the unknown nuances of administrative investigations.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The field of administrative investigations is broad and under-researched. This Article
endeavors to identify and to establish a framework to explore the space with the knowledge that
its depths lie unknown. We have concluded that each branch of federal government that has
enabled administrative investigations to flourish unbounded can take discrete steps to bring them
back to constitutional alignment.
Given the abuses agencies have engaged in and the potential for new technologies to
expand how investigations proceed, it is important that such controls be implemented in the near
future. Congress, with its plenary primacy on the policy and powers of the administrative state,
ought to take first chair to reform the Administrative Procedure Act. Congress should establish
positive procedures that investigating agencies must follow and explicitly create a cause of
action for individuals and entities of the regulated public to access the courts for inappropriate
exercise of administrative investigative power. The executive branch should establish durable
controls of self-restraint so that the American people are treated fairly when agencies act under
Article II to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” 435 The Judiciary should remedy its
432

17 C.F.R. § 202.5(c).
Cuéllar, supra note 20, at 1409–10.
434
5 U.S.C. § 553(e).
435
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 5.
433
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errors in United States v. Morton Salt Co. and Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling436 to
enforce normative constitutional constraints on administrative behavior. It should reassess the
procedural and substantive protections of the APA in line with its legislative history.
Lastly, the American public should be more cognizant of their lack of rights in the face of
administrative investigative power and take steps politically and legally to press for their
restoration, especially in the face of unchecked investigations like those against LabMD. It is
likely that the march of technology and the application of cutting-edge artificial intelligence
strands like machine learning and deep learning to administrative investigations will serve as a
catalyst for these actions. Until then, American society will slowly lose more of their rights.
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United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950); Okla. Press Pub’g Co. v.
Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 209 (1946); see also United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 359 (1989).
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